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Phantom Menace or New Hope:
Member State Public Tort Liability
After the Double-Bladed Light Saber
Duel Between the European Court of
Justice and the German
Bundesgerichtshof in Brasserie du
Pocheur
"Wie das Pier Summer vie Winter auf dem Land sol
geschenkt und prauen werden."t
Markus G. Puder'
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the interactionsbetween European
Community and national law, in the context of Member State
public tort liability. Specifically, the Article analyzes Brasserie
du Ncheur v. Federal Republic of Germany, a case that
pitted German beer purity legislationagainst requirements of
Community law. In that case, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) ruled that acts or omissions of the national legislator
may, under certain conditions, give rise to Member State
public tort liability, which is adjudicated in the national court
systems. The German Federal Court of Justice dismissed the
case afterfinding that the conditions of state liability were not
met under either German or Community law.
The Article discusses in detail the nature and
characteristics of the Member State liability principle
conceived by the ECJ; despite the silence of treaty law on this

t "How in Summer as in Winter the Beer in the Land Shall be Drawn and
Brewed."
* First Legal State Examination, 1987, Ludwig-Maximilians University of
Munich, Germany; Second Legal State Examination, 1990, Upper Court of
Appeals of Munich; Master of Laws, 1991, Georgetown University Law Center;
Ph.D. in Law, 1997, Ludwig-Maximilians University. Member, New York Bar and
U.S. Supreme Court Bar. Dr. Puder is an attorney and researcher with the
Environmental Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory, Washington,
D.C. Office, and an adjunct professor of law at the Georgetown University Law
Center, where he teaches European Union law.
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issue, the ECJ has long supported the notion that a Member
State may incur tort liabilityfor breaching community law. As
a result of ECJjurisprudence,supranationaljudge-made law
may deeply permeate domestic legal orders. However, the
German court's dismissal of the damages claim in Brasserie
du P~cheur demonstrates that Member State liability is not
open-ended. Rather, a balance may be achieved between
European Community (EC)compliance interests and Member
State domestic institutionalprerogatives.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................
THE BRASSERmE DECISIONS OF THE ECJ AND
THE BGH ...............................................................
A.
FactualBackground.....................................
B.
The PreliminaryRuling of the ECJ ................
1.
State Liability for Acts and
Omissions of the National
Legislature Violative of
Community Law ...............................
2.
Conditions of Member State
Liability ............................................
3.
Permissibility of Making Reparation
Conditional upon the Existence
of Fault ............................................
4.
Amount of the Reparation ................
5.
Period Covered by Reparation ..........
C.
The Judgment of the BGH ............................
1.
Claim Based on Domestic
German Law ....................................
a.
Liablity for a Breach in
Public Office .........................
b.
Liability for an
Expropriation-Like
Intrusion ..............................
2.
Claim Based on Community Law .....
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEMBER

313
316
316
318

318
321

324
325
325
326
327
327

327
328

STATE LIABILITY PRINCIPLE CONCEIVED BY THE

ECJ ......................................................................
A.
Emergence of Member State Liability
Through Case Law .......................................
B.
Roots and Foundationsof Member State
Liability .......................................................
C.
Contours of Member State Liability................

329
329
333
337

2000]

EC MEMBER STATE PUBLIC TORT LL4BILITY

1.

Alignment with Non-Contractual
Liability of the Community ...............
Criteria ............................................
Issues for Further Discussion ..........
a.
Other Forms of State Action
as Potential Liability
Triggers ................................
b.
National Measures
Executing Potentially
Unlawful Community
Legislation ............................
c.
Subsidiarity to Other
Remedies ..............................
d.
Quantum of Damages ...........
e.
Plaintiffs, Defendants, and
Fora ......................................
f.
Codification of State
Liability Under Community
Law .......................................

357

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEMBER STATE LIABILITY
PRINCIPLE FOR THE DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS ............

358

2.
3.

IV.

A.

B.
V.

Rendezvous of Supranationaland
Municipal Legal Systems in the Area of
State Liability...............................................
1.
General Observations .......................
2.
Impact on Domestic Liability
Infrastructures .................................
Reflections upon the BGI's Dismissal
of Brasserie-A Case Study .........................

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS .....................................

337
339
346

346

350
352
353
355

358
358
359
361
368

I. INTRODUCTION"

On October 24, 1996, the highest civil court in Germany, the
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof(BGH)), rejected a
claim for damages levied by Brasserie du Pfcheur against the
Federal Republic of Germany.'
The decision drew the final
curtain on a drama of serial litigation 2 pitting German legislation

** The views as well as the translations of foreign legal sources and terms
offered in this article are strictly those of the author as a private individual.
1.
See BGHZ 134, 30, (40); [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971.
2.
See Peter Oliver, Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur v.
Germany, and The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame
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against requirements of European Community (Community) law.3
The German laws had confined the use of the designation "beer
(Bierj to products brewed from certain raw materials and
prohibited the use of additives, basically codifying the ancient
Purity Requirement for Beer (Reinheitsgebot fi2r Bieij-the
hallmark of German beer brewing tradition-which stipulates
malted barley, hops, yeast, and water as the only permitted
ingredients for brewing beer. 4 Under European Court of Justice

Ltd, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1029, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 635, 635 (1997) (speaking of
"two of the longest-running judicial soap operas in the Community's history").
3.
The European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community,
and the European Coal and Steel Community form the supranational first pillar of
the European Union.
The mainly intergovernmental Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters are
organized in the second and third pillars. This Greek temple structure of the
European Union was conceived by the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. (C 340/02) 145 (as amended by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

AND CERTAIN RELATED AcTs, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340/01) 1 (1997) [hereinafter
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]). European Community law, as referenced in this article, is
governed by the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
O.J. (C 340/03) 173 (as amended by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM) [hereinafter EC
TREATY].
For an excellent overview of the treaty architecture and pertinent
terminology, see DAVID A.O. EDWARD & ROBERT C. LANE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
1-2 (1995).
4.
The German Purity Requirement for Beer ranks among the oldest foodand-drug laws in the world. See <http://ourworld.compuserve.co/m/homepages
/KarlPrommersberger/BayemO2.htm> (explaining that (1) as early as 1165, the
City of Augsburg punished drawing bad beer; (2) in 1487, Duke Albrecht enacted
an ordinance fixing the beer price at one cent for the liter of winter beer and two
cents for the liter of summer beer; (3) in addition, brewers were required to
perform a brewing oath (preu-aid)before the Rentmeisterof Upper Bavaria; and (4)
decreed by Duke George the Rich of Bayers-Landshut in 1493 and extended to the
whole of Bavaria in 1516 by Archduke Wilhelm IV, the original German Purity
Requirement for Beer entitled "How in Summer as in Winter the Beer in the Land
Shall Be Drawn and Brewed" (Wie das Pier Summer vie Winter auf dem Land sol
geschenkt und prauenwerden) emerged). See also CARLO DEVITO, THE EVERYTHING
BEER BOOK 5, 11 (1998) (noting that (1) the first recorded description of beer in
words or artifacts date suggests beer brewing may date back between 6000 and
9000 years ago somewhere between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and (2) the
Bavarian Duke was probably interested in protecting consumers' rights but even
more so in improving the national standard so that beer could be reliably exported
and taxed).
For the full text in middle German, see <http://ourworld.
compuserve.com/homepages/Kar.Prommersberger/Bayem02.htm>:
Item wir ordnen, setzen und wollen mit Rathe unnserLanndtschaft das
filran allenthalben in dem Ffirstenthumb Bayrn auff dem Lande auch in
unsern Stettn vie Mdrckthen da desdhalb hieuor kain sonndere ordnung gilt
von Michaelis bis auff Georij ain mass oder kopffpiers fiber einen pfennig
m2ncher werung un von Sant Jorgentag big auf Michaelis die mass 12ber
zwen pfennig derselben werung und derenden der kopff ist fiber drey haller
bey nachgeferter Pene nicht gegeben noch aujlgeschenckht so! werden. Wo
auch ainernit Merrzn sonderannderpierprawenoder sonst haben uwfrde sot
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(ECJ) case law, beers
recipe legislation may
in Germany. 5 They
additives, but must be

that do not conform to the German beer
still be sold under the designation of beer
ingredients and
may contain other raw
6
unequivocally labeled.

erd och das kains weg hdher dann die ma3 umb ainenpfennig schenken und
verkauffen. Wir wollen auch sonderlichendass jfran aUenthalben in unsern
stetten mdrckthen un auf dem lannde zu kainem pier merer stackh dan allain
gersten, hopfen un wasser genommen un gepraucht solle werdn. Welcher
aberdise unsere Ordnung wissendlich i2berfaren unnd nie hallten wurde den
sol von seiner gerichtsobrigkaitdasselbig vas pier zustraff unnachkdJSlich so
offt es geschieht genommen werden. [J]edoch wo ain br fwirt von ainem
ainem pierprewen in unnsern stettn mdckten oder aufm lande jezuzeitn
ainen Emer piers zwen oder drey kauffen und wider unnter den gemaynen
pawrfuolck ausschenken wn2rde dem selben allain aber sonstnyemandes
soldyemaAs oder der kopfpiers umb ainen hailer hdherdann oben gesetzt ist
zugeben un ausschencken erlaube unnd unuerpotn.
For an English translation, see Karl J. Eden, History of German Brewing, 16 (4)
ZYMURGY (Special 1993), available at <http://brewery.org/library/ReinHeit.html>:
We hereby proclaim and decree, by Authority of our Province, that
henceforth in the Duchy of Bavaria, in the country as well as in the cities
and marketplaces, the following rules apply to the sale of beer:
From Michaelmas to Georgi, the price for one Mass [Bavarian Liter 1,069]
or one Kopf [bowl-shaped container for fluids, not quite one Mass], is not to
exceed one Pfennig Munich value, and
From Georgi to Michaelmas, the Mass shall not be sold for more than two
Pfennig of the same value, the Kopf not more than three Heller [Heller
usually one-half Pfennig].
If this not be
administered.

adhered to, the punishment

stated below shall be

Should any person brew, or otherwise have, other beer than March beer, it
is not to be sold any higher than one Pfennig per Mass.
Furthermore, we wish to emphasize that in future in all cities, markets and
in the country, the only ingredients used for the brewing of beer must be
Barley, Hops and Water. Whosoever knowingly disregards or transgresses
upon this ordinance, shall be punished by the Court authorities'
confiscating such barrels of beer, without fail.
Should, however, an innkeeper in the country, city or markets buy two or
three pails of beer (containing 60 Mass) and sell it again to the common
peasantry, he alone shall be permitted to charge one Heller more for the
Mass of the Kopf, than mentioned above. Furthermore, should there arise
a scarcity and subsequent price increase of the barley (also considering
that the times of harvest differ, due to location), WE, the Bavarian Duchy,
shall have the right to order curtailments for the good of all concerned.
See Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987
5.
E.C.R. 1227, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780.
6.
But see <http://ourwodd.conpuserve.co\m/homepages/KarlPrommersberger/
BayemO2.htm> (explaining that (1) such beers, however, have not been accepted by
the German consumer, and (2) on the contrary, large foreign breweries have
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In contrast, the matter of damages to parties allegedly
injured as a result of the Purity Requirement for Beer was not
raised until Brasserie du Pfcheur (hereinafter Brasserie), which
involved proceedings before the German civil courts and the ECJ.
The ECJ's preliminary ruling, which the BGH had requested,
held that Member State public tort liability may be triggered by
domestic legislation violative of Community law. 7 Nevertheless,
the BGH, finding that the conditions of state liability were not
met under German or Community law, dismissed the case. 8
This Article employs the beer litigation as a case study to
analyze the interactions and fault lines between Community and
national law, as exhibited in the context of Member State public
tort liability. Part I juxtaposes the ECJ's and the BGH's Brasserie
decisions.
Part II analyzes the content, characteristics, and
nature of the state liability doctrine conceived by the ECJ. Part
III assesses the effects of the ECJ's jurisprudence on the national
legal orders. Finally, Part IV provides findings and conclusions.

II. THE BRA SSERTE DECISIONS OF THE ECJ AND THE BGH

A. FactualBackground9
The plaintiff, the French beer brewery of Brasserie du
Pdcheur based at Schiltigheim (Alsace), alleged that, until 1981, it
exported significant amounts of beer into the Federal Republic of
Germany. 10 Brasserie claimed that it was forced to discontinue
exports of beer into Germany in late 1981 because the German
authorities objected to the beer asserting that it did not comply
with the German Purity Requirement for Beer laid down in the

acceded to the wishes of German consumers who continue to prefer beers brewed
in accordance with the German Purity Requirement for Beer).
7.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du PNcheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 987.
8.
See Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v. Germany, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971.
9.
For comprehensive depictions of the facts, see Brasseriedu PdcheurSA,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889 (presenting the facts of the case as
provided in (1) the report for the hearing, (2) the Opinion of Advocate General
Tesauro, and (3) the judgment of the ECJ); Brasserie du Pdcheur SA, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 971 (containing the description of the facts by the BGH); Dirk Ehlers, Die
Weiterentwicklung
des
Staatshaftungsrechts durch das
europdische
Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1996 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 776 (giving a concise summary of the
facts).
10.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 776 (1996) (noting that in the midseventies Brasserie's exports into Germany reached a level of over 100,000 hl,
however declined in the subsequent years until coming to a total halt in 1982).

2000]

EC MEMBER STATE PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY

German Law on Beer Duty (Biersteuergesetz (BStG))."
Fines
were assessed against staff of the plaintiff's German contract
partner, which undertook the importation and distribution of the
beer in Germany, as well as buyers acting for food market chains,
in which the beer was sold. 12 In its letter of November 4, 1981
addressed to the plaintiff, the distributor declared that the
frequency of administrative proceedings pressed against it as the
importer made it advisable to desist from all importation of the
plaintiffs beer into Germany forthwith until the resolution of the
issues raised by the Purity Requirement for Beer. 13
The Commission of the European Communities took the view
that the provisions of the German Law on Beer Duty contradicted
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)
and initiated infringement proceedings against the Federal
Republic of Germany. The Commission's complaint was directed
at the prohibition on marketing under the designation Bier (beer)
of beer lawfully manufactured in other Member States according
to different recipe rules (designation prohibition), as well as the
14
importation ban on beer containing additives (ban on additives).
By judgment of March 12, 1987, the ECJ held that both
prohibitions imposed by Germany were incompatible with the EC
Treaty.15
Brasserie consequently brought an action against the Federal
Republic of Germany for reparation of the loss incurred from
1981 until 1987 as a result of the import restrictions, including a
partial claim for DM 1.8 million ($1.1 million).16 The District
Court
(Landgerich4
and
Upper
District
Court
(OberlandesgericIhl)7 rejected the complaint and the plaintiff
appealed to the BGH. 18 After receiving the ECJ's preliminary
ruling on the conditions under which a Member State may incur
liability for damage caused to individuals by breaches of
Community law attributable to that State, the BGH denied the
claim for damages levied by the plaintiff.19

11.
See §§ 9-10 of Biersteuergesetz (hereinafter BStG) v. 14.3.1952 (BGBI. I
S.149), v. 14.12.1976 (BGB1. I S.3341, 3357).
12.
See Brasseriedu PdcheurSA, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971.

13.

See id.

14.
See id.
15.
See Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987
E.C.R. 1227, [19881 1 C.M.L.R. 780.
16.
See Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v. Germany, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971.
17.

See 7 EUROPAISCHE ZEITscHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFTsRECHT 574 (1996).

18.
For an overview of the German court system, see Patricia Dugdale, The
West German Court System, 83 LAw SOCIETY'S GAZETrE 2665 (1986).
19.
See Brasserie du PcheurSA, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971.
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The PreliminaryRuling of the ECJ2 0

On March 5, 1996, the ECJ handed down its preliminary
ruling resolving the five questions submitted to it by the BGH.
The ECJ's answers addressed (1) the emergence of Member State
liability for acts and omissions of the national legislature violative
of Community law, 2 1 (2) the conditions under Community law
triggering a guarantee of a right to reparation of loss or damage
caused to individuals by breaches of Community law attributable
to a Member State, 2 2 (3) the permissibility of making reparation
conditional upon the existence of fault,23 (4) the criteria for
determining the amount of the reparation, 24 and (5) the period
25
covered by the reparation.
1. State Liability for Acts and Omissions of the National
Legislature Violative of Community Law
The ECJ ruled that acts or omissions of the national
legislature contrary to Community law qualify as potential
triggers of state liability, which requires Member States to

20.
Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889.
21.
See id. at 1-1036-37:
Does the principle of Community law according to which Member States
are obliged to pay compensation for damage suffered by an individual as a
result of breaches of Community law attributable to those States also
apply where such a breach consists of a failure to adapt a national
parliamentary statute to the higher-ranking rules of Community law (this
case concerning a failure to adapt [Sections] 9 and 10 of the fBStG] to
Article [281 of the [EC] Treaty)?
22.
See id. at 1-1037 ("May the national legal system provide that any
entitlement to compensation is to be subject to the same limitations as those
applying where a national statute breaches higher-ranking national law, for
example where an ordinary Federal law breaches the Grundgesetz of the Federal
Republic of Germany?").
23.
See id. ("May the national legal system provide that entitlement to
compensation is to be conditional on fault (intent or negligence) on the part of the
organs of the State responsible for the failure to adapt the legislation?").
24.
See id. ("May liability to pay compensation under the national legal
system be limited to the reparation of damage done to specific individual legal
interests, for example property, or does it require full compensation for all
financial losses, including lost profits?").
25.
See id. ("Does the obligation to pay compensation also require
reparation of the damage already incurred before it was held in the judgment of
the European Court of Justice of 12 March 1987 in Case 178/84, Commission v.
Germany, [1987] E.C.R. 1227 that [Section] 10 of the [BStG] infringed higherranking Community law?").
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compensate individuals for damages suffered as a result of
breaches of Community law.2 6 The ECJ reasoned that the
principle, which was inherent in the system of the EC Treaty,
27
alleged breaches committed by the domestic legislature.
According to the ECJ, in light of the fundamental requirement of
the Community legal system that Community law be uniformly
applied, 28 the rise of Member State liability "cannot depend on
domestic rules [governing] the division of powers between
constitutional authorities."2 9 The Court stated that this approach
was consistent with international law3 0 and, in the Community
legal system, "all State authorities, including the legislature, are
bound in performing their tasks to comply with the rules laid
down by [Community] law directly governing the situation of
3

individuals." '
The ECJ rejected two alleged limitations to the emergence of
Member State liability. According to the Court, state liability was
not dependent upon the absence of a directly effective provision
of Community law3 2 or upon the existence of formal legislation
33
granting individuals access to reparations from the government.
The ECJ explained that the right of individuals to rely on directly
effective provisions before national courts was only a minimum
guarantee, not in itself sufficient to ensure full and complete

26.
See id. at 1-1145.
27.
See id.
28.
See id. (referring in particular to Joined Cases C-143/88 & C-92/89,
Zuckerfabrik Sfiderdithmarschen AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe & Zuckerfabrik
Soest GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn, 1991 E.C.R. 1-415, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 1).
29.
Id.
30.
See id. (referring to Advocate General Tesauro's Opinion stating that
international law, for purposes of breaches of international commitments, views a
state as a single entity irrespective of whether the damage was attributable to the
legislature, the judiciary, or the executive).
31.
Id.
32.
See id. at 1-1142 (recalling the contentions of the German, Irish, and
Netherlands Governments that (1) Member States were required to make good loss
or damage caused to individuals only where the provisions breached were not
directly effective, (2) in Francouich, the ECJ simply sought to fill a lacuna in the
system for safeguarding rights of individuals, and (3) in so far as national law
afforded individuals a cause of action enabling them to assert their rights before
their national courts under directly effective provisions of Community law, it was
unnecessary, where such provisions were breached, also to grant them a right to
reparation founded directly on Community law).
33.
See id. at 1-1143 (providing the position of the German Government
that (1) a general right to reparation for individuals could be created only by
legislation, and (2) the recognition of such a right by judicial decision would be
incompatible with the institutional balance established by the Treaty as well as
the allocation of powers between the Community institutions and the Member
States).
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compliance with Community law.?
The Court emphasized that
direct effect could "not, in every [instance], secure for individuals
the benefit of the rights conferred on them by [Community] law"3 5
and the operation of direct effect was not designed to remedy
damages which individuals may incur as a result of a breach of
Community law attributable to a Member State.3 6 The Court
argued that the full effectiveness of Community law would be
impaired if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their
rights were infringed by a Member State's breach of Community
law.3 7 The ECJ found that in cases of infringement of directly
effective Community law, "the right to reparation [was] the
necessary corollary of the direct effect" of Community law when
the breached provision caused the damage sustained by the
injured parties.3 8 According to the Court, such a situation had
arisen in the case at bar.3 9
Addressing the second alleged limitation, the ECJ held that
its jurisdiction to interpret questions of Community law included
adjudging "the existence and extent of state liability for damage
ensuing as a result of a breach of obligations incumbent on the
State by virtue of Community law."4° The Court reasoned that its
primary task and power of interpretation was rooted in primary
Community law directing the ECJ to ensure that "in the
interpretation and application of [the treaties] the law is
observed." 4 1 This, the Court continued, included ruling on a
question
pursuant
to
generally
accepted
methods
of
interpretation, in particular by reference to the fundamental
principles of Community law and, where necessary, to general
principles common to laws of the Member States. 4 2 According to

34.
See id. at 1-1142 (referring in particular to Case 168/85, Commission v.
Italian Republic, 1986 E.C.R. 2945, para. 11; Case C-120/88, Commission v. Italian
Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-621, para. 10; and Case C-119/89, Commission v.
Kingdom of Spain, 1991 E.C.R. 1-641, para. 9).
35.
Id.
36.
See id. at 1-1142-43 (reasoning that (1) provisions of a non-transposed
directive may be insufficiently precise and unconditional, and therefore preclude
individuals from relying on direct effect before their national courts, and (2) state
liability actions for reparation against the defaulting Member State for breach of
the third paragraph of Article 249 of the EC Treaty serve "to redress the injurious
consequences of a Member State's failure to transpose a directive as far as
beneficiaries of that directive are concerned").
37.
See id. at 1-1142.
38.
Id. at 1-1143.
39.
See id. (finding that Article 28 of the EC Treaty has direct effect and
that breach of such a provision may give rise to reparation).
40.
Id. (stating that in the case at issue those questions of interpretation
had been referred to the Court by national courts pursuant to Article 234 of the
EC Treaty).
41.
Id. at 1-1144 (invoking Article 220 of the EC Treaty).
42.
See id. (referring to Article 288 of the EC Treaty).
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the ECJ, in both legal systems the essentials of the legal rules
43
governing state liability were shaped by the courts.
2. Conditions of Member State Liability
The ECJ emphasized that the rise of state liability, albeit
varying with the nature of each case, was based on the core
fundamentals of the Community legal order. 4 4 These principles,
the Court continued, included the protection of individual rights,
the full effectiveness and uniform application of Community law,
and the duty of sincere cooperation between the Community and
45
the Member States.
The Court fashioned its analysis along its established
jurisprudence with respect to the rules of non-contractual
liability of the Community under the EC Treaty.4 6 The ECJ found
that its case law was basically driven by the margin of discretion
available to the legislator.4 7 The Court recalled that under its
"strict standard," when Community institutions act in legislative
contexts characterized by the need to exercise wide discretion
and make economic choices, the Community cannot incur
liability unless the institutions concerned have manifestly and
gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of their powers. 48
The ECJ then addressed the Member State level and
distinguished between acts or omissions of the national
legislature in a field governed by Community law as opposed to

43.
See id. (stating that non-contractual liability of the Community under
Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty and the referenced laws common to the legal orders
of the Member States both reflect the generally recognized obligation of public
authorities to make good damage caused by unlawful acts or omissions in the
performance of their duties).
44.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du P~cheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. I- 1029, 1-1146, [19961 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 987.
45.
See id. (referring to the need for effective protection of the rights
conferred by Community rules and the solidarity bond enshrined in Article 10 of
the EC Treaty).
46.
See id. at 1- 1146-47.
47.
See id. at 1-1147 (identifying "the complexity of the situations to be
regulated, difficulties in the application or interpretation of the texts and, more
particularly, the margin of discretion available to the author of the act in
question1 as salient factors for deciding whether liability was incurred).
48.
See id. at 1-1147-48 (referring to Joined Cases 83/76, 94/76, 4/77,
15/77 & 40/77,Bayerische HNL VermehrungsbetriebeGmbH & Co. KG v. Council&
Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 1209, paras. 5-6, [19781 3 C.M.L.R. 566, in support of
the general rationale for this approach that "even where the legality of measures is
subject to judicial review, exercise of the legislative function must not be hindered
by the prospect of actions for damages whenever the general interest of the
Community requires legislative measures to be adopted which may adversely
affect individual interestse).
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legislative activity or inactivity in an area of law characterized by
wide Member State discretion. 4 9
The Court stated that
requirements of Community law may narrow a national
legislature's margin of discretion.5 0
In contrast, the ECJ
continued, when a Member State legislated in a field involving
broad discretion, liability standards were comparable to those
applicable to Community institutions.5 1 The Court found that, in
absence of Community harmonization of foodstuffs laws, the
German legislature, when enacting rules on the quality of beer
marketed in Germany, enjoyed wide discretion and basically
faced policy choices similar to those made by the Community
institutions when adopting legislative measures pursuant to
S2
Community policies.
The ECJ deduced that individuals suffering loss or injury as
a result of a breach of Community law by a Member State, which
is attributable to the national legislature acting in a field involving
wide discretion for making legislative choices, are entitled to
reparation when the following requirements are met: (1) the rule
of Community law breached is intended to confer rights upon
individuals, (2) the breach is sufficiently serious, and (3) the
breach and the damage sustained by the individuals have a direct
53
causal link.
54
The Court then tested the three conditions in the case at bar.
The ECJ found that the first condition was satisfied because the
breached provision of the EC Treaty was designed to accord rights
to individuals.5 5
Addressing the second condition, the Court
defined a "sufficiently serious" breach as a manifest and grave

49.
See id. at 1-1148.
50.
See id. (explaining that the case of Article 249 of the EC Treaty, which
"places the Member State under an obligation to take, within a given period, all
the measures needed in order to achieve the result required by a directive,"
illustrated the reduced margin of discretion on behalf of a national legislature and
the ensuing rise of state liability if the Member State failed to transpose the
directive).
51.
See id.
52.
See id.
53.
See id. at 1-1149. The Court also stated that (1) "those conditions
satisfy the requirements of the full effectiveness of the rules of Community law
and of the effective protection of the rights which those rules confer," and (2)
"those conditions correspond in substance to those defined by the Court in
relation to Article [288] in its case-law on liability of the Community for damage
caused to individuals by unlawful legislative measures adopted by its
institutions." Id.
54.
See id. at 1-1150-55.
55.
See id. at 1-1150 (referring to Case 74/76, lannelli & Volpi S.p.A. v. Ditta
Paolo Meron4 1977 E.C.R. 557, para. 13, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 688, in the context of
the position that "[w]hilst Article [28] [of the EC Treaty] imposes a prohibition on
Member States, it nevertheless gives rise to rights for individuals which the
national courts must protect").
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disregard by a Member State for the limits of its discretion. It listed
various factors for making this determination, including (1) the
clarity and precision of the rule breached, (2) the extent of discretion
left by that rule to the authorities, (3) the degree of intent involved,
(4) the excusability of the act or omission, (5) the degree of
contribution by Community institutions, and (6) the adoption or
retention of national measures or practices contrary to Community
law.S 6 The ECJ added that a persistent non-compliance with an
ECJ judgment establishing the infringement at issue would
constitute such a breach.5 7 The Court then distinguished between
the designation prohibition and the ban on additives imposed by the
BStG.5 8 The ECJ found that the German legislature was not
excused when imposing the designation prohibition in light of the
clear early case law establishing the manifest incompatibility of
such rules with the EC Treaty.5 9 In contrast, according to the Court,
such jurisprudence did not exist for the banning of additives until
the ECJ's judgment involving the German Purity Requirement for
Beer. 60 The Court concluded its analysis of the three conditions by
deferring to the national courts for the determination of direct
causation between the breach committed by the Member State and
61
the damage incurred by the injured party.
With regard to the modalities of the claim, the ECJ held that
injured parties had to proceed against the State within the
framework of national law.6 2 The Court emphasized that the
conditions for reparation of loss and damage laid down by
national law could not be less favorable than those relating to
similar domestic claims and could not be organized so as to make
obtaining reparation practically impossible or excessively

56.

See id.

57.
See id. (explaining that a "breach of Community law will clearly be
sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement
in question to be established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the
Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question
constituted an infringement," and that another example of an infringement
constituting a sufficiently serious breach lies in the failure to adopt immediately
the measures needed to comply with an Order of the President of the Court in
proceedings for interim measures).
58.
See id. at 1-1151.
59.
See id. (referencing in particular Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
BundesmonopolverwatungffrBranntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 119791 3 C.M.L.R. 49
('Cassis de Dijon") and Case 193/80, Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3019
("vinegar'), both involving breaches of Article 28 of the EC Treaty).
60.
See id. (referring to its judgment of 12 March 1987 in Case 178/84,
Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R.
780, which held the prohibition of additives incompatible with Article 28 of the EC
Treaty).
61.
See id. at 1-1152.
62.
See id. at 1-1153.
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The ECJ found that the restrictions imposed by

German law, which requires that the legislative act or omission in
breach of higher ranking national provisions be referable to a
third party (Drittbezogenhei),6 4 did not appear to disfavor Member
State liability claims vis-A-vis similar domestic claims, but would
in practice make it impossible or extremely difficult to secure
effective reparation for loss or damage resulting from a breach of
Community law.65 In general, the Court explained, the tasks of
the national legislature related to the public at large, as opposed
to identifiable persons or classes of persons. 6 6
The Court
concluded that in national state liability proceedings for damages
involving a breach of Community law by the national legislature,
67
such a restriction had to be set aside.
3. Permissibility of Making Reparation Conditional upon the
Existence of Fault
The ECJ held that a national court could not, under the
legislation that it applied, make reparation for loss or damage
conditional upon a requirement of fault exhibited by the Member
State organ responsible for the infringement of Community law,
which went beyond the seriousness criterion.6 8
The Court
conceded that a variety of objective and subjective factors
possibly connected to the concept of fault could be factored into
the determination of whether the Member State, through its
legislature, had committed a sufficiently serious breach of
Community law. According to the ECJ, however, national courts

63.
See id. (citing Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian
Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, and Case 199/82,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgio, 1983 E.C.R. 3595,
[1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658).
64.
See § 839 Nr. 1(1) BGB; GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 34
(F.R.G.). The translation of § 839 Nr. 1(1) BGB reads as follows: 'If a public
official intentionally or negligently breaches an official duty incumbent on him or
her toward a third party, then he or she has to compensate the third party for the
damage resulting therefrom." Id.
65.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1154, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 992.
66.
See id.
67.
See id.
68.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1155-56, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 993-94 (referring to its
analysis of the conditions for Member State liability and noting that, according to
the case file, "the concept of fault does not have the same content in the various
legal systems").
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were disallowed from altering and frustrating the standard by
6 9
requiring an element of fault, including intent or negligence.
4. Amount of the Reparation
The ECJ ruled that reparation awards in Member State
liability cases had to be commensurate with the loss or damage
sustained by the injured parties. 70 The Court noted the absence
of relevant Community provisions and emphasized that criteria
established by the domestic legal systems of the Member States
were subject to limitations, which the Court had established for
71
the modalities of pursuing Member State liability claims.
According to the ECJ, Community law barred national
proceedings under national law from imposing conditions that,
when compared to domestic government liability actions, were
less favorable and excessively burdensome. 72 The Court added
several considerations for a national court determining the extent
of the award in a Member State liability action for damages,
including the degree of contribution by the claimants7 3 and the
potential types and heads of damages. 74
5. Period Covered by Reparation
The ECJ held that the onset of Member State liability was not
contingent on a prior judgment of the Court finding that a
Member State had infringed Community law.75
The Court
reasoned that the finding of state liability was governed by the
conditions that it had developed earlier. 76 It added that imposing

69.
See id.
70.
See id. at 1-1156 (reaffiurming the need to ensure the effective protection
of the rights of the claimants).
71.
See id. at 1-1157.
72.
See id.
73.
See id. (citing Joined Cases C-104/89 & C-37/90, Mulder v. Council &
Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 1-306 1, in support of the proposition that, in accordance
with a general principle common to the legal systems of the Member States, the
injured parties had to show reasonable diligence in avoiding or limiting the extent
of the loss or damage, or otherwise risk having to bear the damage themselves).
74.
See id. at 1-1157-58 (stating that Community law disallowed (1) a total
exclusion of loss of profit as a head of damage, especially in the context of
economic or commercial litigation, by requiring an injury to property rights as
opposed to the mere marketing opportunities, and (2) a foreclosure of otherwise
domestically available specific damages, including exemplary damages).
75.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1160, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 996.
76.
See id. at 1-1159 (stating that, while being of "determinative" value, a
prior judgment of the ECJ was "not essential" for meeting the condition of a
sufficiently serious breach of Community law).
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an additional requirement would undermine the right to
reparation established by the Community legal system 7 7 and
frustrate the principle of the effectiveness of Community law. 78
The ECJ concluded its analysis by addressing a proposal
from the German government to limit the temporal effects of the
present judgment. 7 9 The Court declined the request, reasoning
that procedural and substantive conditions of national lawwithin the standards governing the pursuit of state liability
claims developed by the ECJ-were able to address concerns
relating to the principle of legal certainty. 80
C. The Judgment of the BGH
The BGH held the appeal admissible but dismissed it as
unfounded. The Court identified the rise of government liability
for legislative injustice (legislatives Unrecht) as the sole subject of
review in the case at bar, as Germany allegedly failed to adjust its
Law on Beer Duty to the higher ranking norms of Community
law.8 1 The BGH clarified that liability issues were not posed in
connection with the singular administrative measures taken by
the German authorities on the basis of provisions breaching
Community law.8 2 According to the plaintiff's own submissions,
the BGH continued, the proceedings, especially those involving
fines, were not initiated against the plaintiff itself, but rather
against its contract partners in Germany.8 3 The BGH analyzed
German national law and Community law as the potential

77.
See id. at 1-1159-60 (reasoning that any right to reparation would be
precluded as long as the presumed infringement had not been the subject of
judgment of the Court in an action brought by the Commission against the
Member State under Article 226 of the EC Treaty).
78.
See id. (citing Joined Cases 314/81, 315/81, 316/81 & 83/82,
Procureurde la Rdpublique v. Waterkeyn, 1982 E.C.R. 4337, para. 16, as authority
for the proposition that direct effect of Community provisions giving individuals
subjective rights enforceable before their national courts could not 'depend on the
Commission's assessment of the expediency of taking action against a Member
State pursuant to Article [226] of the Treaty or on the delivery by the Court of any
judgment finding an infringement").
79.
See id. at 1-1160 (recalling that the German Government, in light of the
potential financial implications, requested the ECJ "to limit any damage to be
made good by the Federal Republic of Germany to loss or damage sustained after
delivery of judgment in this case, in so far as the victims did not bring legal
proceedings or make an equivalent claim before").
80.
See id.
81.
See Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v. Germany, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971, 976.
82.
See id.
83.
See id. (observing that the complaint contained the reference that the
plaintiff proper was never the addressee of any unfavorable administrative
enforcement act).
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sources for the government liability claim advanced by the
84
plaintiff.
1. Claim Based on Domestic German Law
The BGH held that German state liability law did not offer
any cause of action for the plaintiff's action.8 5 According to the
BGH, neither liability for a breach in public office (Amtshaftung)
nor liability for an expropriation-like intrusion (Haftungfir einen
86
enteignungsgleichenEingrifjj controlled the case at bar.
a. Liability for a Breach in Public Office
The BGH rejected the claim because the omission by the
German legislature to adjust the Beer Duty Law to requirements
under primary Community law did not breach any official duty
toward the foreign brewery allegedly affected by the restriction of
imports.8 7 The BGH explained that official duties were directed
at the public at large, as opposed to specific persons or groups of
persons, and served the general interest of maintaining an orderly
public life. 8 8 Legislative functions, the BGH added, were exercised
in that general interest through statutes and regulations
containing general and abstract rules.8 9 According to the BGH,
only specific-measure statutes (Massnahmengesetze) or singlecase statutes (Einzelfallgesetze) altered the position of individuals
or particular classes of persons, thus meeting the criterion of
third persons. 90
The Court, however, found that such
exceptional circumstances were not satisfied in the present
91
case.
b. Liability for an Expropriation-Like Intrusion
The BGH also denied the claim of liability for an
expropriation-like intrusion. 92
The BGH reasoned that the
compensation for disadvantages, which arose (directly or
indirectly) by reason of a formal parliamentary act contrary to
Community law, did not remain within the boundaries of a

84.
85.
86.
87.

See id
See id.
See id.
See id.

at 976-77.
at 976.
at 976-77.
at 976.

88.
89.

See id.
See id.

90.

See id.

91.
92.

See &i
See id. at 976-77.
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liability category developed and shaped by case law.93 The BGH
stated that this matter should be reserved to the legislature. 9 4 In
addition, the BGH explained, the requirements of an
expropriation-like intrusion were not satisfied because the facts
of the case did not support a breach of a vested property right of
the plaintiff.95 According to the BGH, the German legal system
did not recognize a mere opportunity to sell products on the
German market as a protected asset.9 6 The BGH concluded that
of even
the circumstances of the case did not meet the threshold
97
touching the core of the plaintiffs property rights.
2. Claim Based on Community Law
The BGH also dismissed the plaintiffs claim based on
Community law. 98 The BGH emphasized that, because the
principle of Member State liability for breaches of Community law
flowed directly from the Community legal system and only the
consequences of the damage had to be remedied within the
a re-examination of German
framework of national law, 9 9
domestic government liability for legislative injustice was not
warranted 100
Applying the facts advanced by the plaintiff, in light of the
ECJ's preceding preliminary ruling,1 0 1 the BGH decided that a
claim for damages failed for want of a sufficiently serious breach
that directly caused the alleged damage.1 0 2 The BGH held that
the designation prohibition, which had been adjudged by the ECJ
as a sufficiently serious breach of Community law, had not been
enforced by German authorities against the plaintiff, as the food
inspections and penalty proceedings were conducted in the

93.
See id. at 976.
94.
See id. at 977.
See id.
95.
See id.
96.
See id.
97.
See Brasserie du P6cheur SA v. Germany, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971, 977.
98.
See id. at 978 (reasoning that the ECJ had "transferred" the system
99.
which it had developed specifically under Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty).
100. See id. (stating that it was not necessary, in particular, to decide
whether the conditions for state liability for a legislative injustice may have to be
changed under an interpretation "in conformity with European law" in such a way
that the criterion of third-party directedness would have to be questioned for the
sphere of application of the German domestic legal order).
101. See id. at 978-79 (summarizing the pertinent passages from the ECJ's
preliminary ruling, which develop the three conditions for Member State liability
in areas where, in the absence of EC harmonization, the national legislator enjoys
a wider margin of discretion).
102. See id. at 979.
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context of the ban on additives.' 0 3 Hence, the requirement of a
direct causal connection between the infringement of Community
law and damage to the injured party was not satisfied.104
The BGH also denied the claim pertaining to the ban on
additives as not constituting a sufficiently serious breach of
Community law.' 0 5 The BGH argued that the ECJ's judgment of
March 12, 1987 provided no indication that the national
legislature had manifestly and gravely overstepped the
06
boundaries of its discretion.
Finally, the BGH decided that Germany was also not liable
for further damages alleged by the plaintiff for the time
subsequent to the ECJ judgment of March 12, 1987.107 The BGH
reasoned that the defendant had notified and instructed the
authorities to adhere to that decision immediately after its
publication.' 0 8
The plaintiffs loss of earnings during the
transitional time, while it built a new distribution organization in
Germany, was not attributable to the defendant in legal liability
terms.1° 9 According to the BGH, these disadvantages did not
result from a failure of the defendant to implement the ECJ's
judgment. 110
III. NATURE AND

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEMBER STATE LIABILITY

PRINCIPLE CONCEIVED BY THE ECJ

A. Emergence of Member State Liability Through Case Law

The EC Treaty does not contain any explicit and specific legal
provisions governing claims for damages advanced by individuals
against Member States for breaches of Community law."' Early

103.
See id. at 980.
104.
See id. at 980-81 (explaining that (1) this result followed from an
evaluative re-attribution of the liability consequences to the liability trigger,
which, under German law, is expressed by the doctrine of adequate causation,
and (2) it did not have to address the need for a narrower approach focusing on
the protective purpose of the breached norm).
105.
See id. at 981.
106.
See id.
107.
See id.
108.
See id
109.
See id- at 981-82.
110.
See i.
at 982 (arguing that the lost earnings were the late
consequences of the defendant's previous conduct, which did not constitute a
sufficiently serious breach of Community law).
111.
See Monika B6hm, Voraussetzungen einer Staatshaftung bei Verst6Jien
gegen primires Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1997 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 53-54 (1997). See also
Dennis F. Waelbroeck, Treaty Violations and Liability of Member States: The Effect
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ECJ case law, however, suggests that despite the silence of treaty
law, the Court has long been leaning in favor of the notion that a
Member State may incur liability. 112 Nevertheless, the Court
never squarely confronted the question until many years later in
Francovich.1 13 Since then, the ECJ has handed down several

of the Francovich Case Law, in THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN COMMUNITY LAW 311,
315 (Ton Heukels & Alison McDonnell eds., 1997) (observing that (1) for many
years Article 88 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community provided the only mechanism for sanctions but was never applied
because of its heaviness and partial ineffectiveness, and (2) the penalty scheme of
Article 228 of the EC Treaty added by the Treaty on European Union to Articles
226 and 227 of the EC Treaty may involve significant delays); J. Dutheil de la
Rochre, Member State Liabilityfor Infringement of European Community Law, 11
TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1, 2 (emphasizing that "the Article [226] procedure does not
provide the individuals with the insurance [sic] that Member States will effectively
respect Community law."). For an illustration of the pre-Maastricht, rudimentary
nature of this system, see Commission Notice Concerning the Judgment of the
Court of Justice of 21 September 1989 in Case 68/88, 1990 O.J. (C 147/03) 3
(providing that the Commission could only recommend to the States that, while
keeping the choice of sanctions, they shall ensure that the breaches of
Community law shall be punished in an effective proportionate and deterrent
way.). For a description of the post-Maastricht sharpened enforcement procedure
under Article 228 of the EC Treaty, see PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAw-

376-77 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that by early 1998 the
ECJ had not ruled on any enforcement proceeding). See also Memorandum on
Applying Article 171 of the EC Treaty, 1996 O.J. (C 242/07) 6 (containing a
memorandum from the Commission on the criteria to be applied in the future to
implement the enforcement provision); 1997 O.J. (C 63/02) 2 (providing the
method of calculation for penalties).
112. See, e.g., Case 6/60, Humblet v. Belgian State, 1960 E.C.R. 559, 569
(opining that the defendant Member State may be obliged "to rescind the measure
in question and to make reparation for any unlawful consequences which may
have ensued"); Case 60/75, Russo v. AlMA, 1976 E.C.R. 45, 56 (stating that '[i]f
such damage has been caused through an infringement of Community law the
State is liable to the injured party of the consequences in the context of the
provisions of national law on the liability of the State"). See also Oliver, supra note
2, at 638 (characterizing the language in these decisions as "rather fleeting
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS

pronouncements on that issue").

But see Case 158/80, Rewe v. Hauptzoliamt

Kiel, 1981 E.C.R. 1805, 1838 (holding that Community law "was not intended to
create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of
Community law other than those already laid down by national law").
113. Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991
E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66. This cornerstone decision, which involved
the complete non-implementation of a Community directive, has generated a vast
amount of commentary and literature. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH HENRICHS, HAFTUNG
DER EG-MITGLIEDSTAATEN FOR VERLETZUNG VON GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT (1995);
CARSTEN ALBERS, DIE HAFTUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND FOR DIE
NICHTUMSETZUNG VON EG-RCHTLININEN 72 (1995); Carmen Plaza Martin, Furthering
the Effectiveness of EC Directives and the Judicial Protection of Individual Rights
Thereunder, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 26; Rolf Uecker, Francouich and Beyond: A
GermanPerspective, 1994 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 286; Mark Brealey, The Liability of the
State in Damages for Breach of Community Law, 1992 EUROP. Bus. L. REV. 39;
Peter Duffy, Damages Against the State: A New Remedy for Failure to. Implement
Community Obligations 17 EUR. L. REV. 133 (1992).
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seminal decisions, including Brasserie,1 14 British Telecom,"1 s
Hedley Lomas,116 and Dillenkofer,1 17 that have expanded and
118
refined the Court's state liability jurisprudence.
Critics of the Court have argued that, by developing the
principle of Member State liability, the ECJ continues to arrogate
legislative powers to itself.1 19 Focusing on methodology, these
commentators have alleged that the gap in the EC Treaties with
regard to Member State liability is not plan-adverse and therefore
can only be filled by treaty amendment, not by judicial legislation
Moreover, the terse, minimalist jurisfrom the bench. 120
prudential reasoning offered by the ECJ in support of its holdings
has been faulted. 12 1 Finally, some have branded the Court's
judicial activism as a violation of the delicate balance among
Community institutions and as a disregard for the allocation of
powers between the Member States and the Community.1 22 The

114. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889.
115.
Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury, ex parte British
Telecommunications plc, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1631, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
116.
Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
exparte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 391.
117. Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 & C-190/94,
Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4845, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 469.
118.
For case notes discussing this quartet of decisions, see Peter Oliver,
Case C-329/93, The Queen v. Her Majesty's Treasury, ex parte British
Telecommunications, (1996] ECR I-1631, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 658 (1997); Peter
Oliver, Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Afmistry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex
parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland), 11996] ECR 1-2553, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 666
(1997); Peter Oliver, Case C-1 78/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, Judgment of 8 October
1996, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 675 (1997).
119.
For a review of the generic criticisms levied against the alleged judicial
activism of the ECJ, especially in German and English circles, see, for example,
L. NEVILLE

BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1994); G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy
and the European Court of Justice,57 MOD. L. REv. 175 (1994); Ehlers, supra note
9, at 777 (summarizing the concerns pertaining to ECJ lawmaking in the area of
state liability); Rudolph Streinz, Anmerkungen zu dem EuGH-Urtel in der
Rechtssache Brasserie du Pdcheurund Factortame, 7 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
WIRTScHAFTSREcHT 201, 202 (1996) (explaining that, in light of the Federal
Constitutional Court's Maastricht Decision, one could argue that the ECJ does not
have the general power to introduce an indemnification scheme).
120.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 777 (recapitulating the position of the
German Government).
121.
See B6hm, supranote 111, at 54 n.18 (providing several references in
the German legal literature). But see Streinz, supra note 119, at 202 (observing
that in light of the Court's past usages the judgement is relatively detailed).
122.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Picheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1082, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 935 (describing allegations of
the German Government). See also Ehlers, supra note 9, at 777 (explaining that
(1)
this
argumentation
transplants
the
German
essentiality
theory
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introduction of state liability into the treaty system, it has been
argued, amounts to an unauthorized qualitative leap in the

integration program, triggering significant financial consequences
and strengthening the position of the market citizens.
As previously described, the ECJ gave these concerns "short
shrift,"123 explaining that its methodological approach stayed
within the confines of treaty interpretation using the appropriate
interpretational tools allowed by primary Community law.

Supporters of this line of reasoning have characterized the
Court's state liability decisions as essential contributions to the
viability of Community law. 12 4 Some have explained that the
significance of the courts for the rise of state liability stems from

the reluctance of the government to enable liability claims against
itself.125 Others have justified the ECJ's approach by adding that
the Brasseriereference proceeding involved redress for breaches
of Community fundamental freedoms. 12 6 The deflective content
of freedom rights, according to these commentators, enshrines
claims to desist from action (Unterlassungsanspn2cheand claims
to eliminate undue consequences (Folgenbeseitigungsanspn2che).
If, in the wake of unlawful intrusions of freedom rights, the
elimination of undue consequences was no longer possible, the
very nature of these rights mandated the rise and availability of
compensation.'12 7 Since the EC Treaty did not speak to state
liability triggers and consequences, it fell to the ECJ to ensure the
proper functioning of Community law through judge-made law,
which was binding on Germany. 128 Finally, the argument has

(Wesentlichkeitstheorie)into the Community legal system, (2) this doctrine explains
the principle of reservation to statutory law (Gesetzesvorbehalt) through a
delineation of the legislative and executive branches of government, and (3) these
domestic law principles are used for purposes of delimiting the legislature and
judiciary in the Community legal order).
123. Oliver, supranote 2, at 642.
124. See, B~hm, supra note 111, at 54 (providing numerous literature
references).
125. See id. at 55 (referring to the example of German law where the liability
figures of intrusion equivalent to a taking and expropriation-like have been
developed by the judiciary).
126. See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 777 (explaining that the fundamental
freedoms contain equality and freedom rights).
127. Id.
128. See id. (recalling that the German Federal Constitutional Court has
stated that subsequent essential changes of the integration programs and powers
established in the EC Treaty were no longer covered by the applicable German
ratification law, yet explaining that this was not the case here because
Community law demanded the rise of state liability for its sphere of application,
whereas the tasks and objectives of the Community were left untouched and the
powers of the Community were not expanded). For a description of the Federal
Constitutional Court, see BERND GUGGENBERGER & THOMAS WORTENBERGER, HOTER
DER VERFASSUNG ODER LENKER DER POLITIK?

DAs BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT IM

20001

EC MEMBER STATE PUBLIC TORT LL4BILITY

333

been advanced that the Member States impliedly ratified the
ECJ's state liability case law by default in failing to make the
pertinent revisions to the EC Treaty at Maastricht or
Amsterdam.129
B. Roots and Foundationsof Member State Liability
The question of whether the principle of state liability is
anchored in Community law or national law has been discussed
for many years.1 3 0 According to the ECJ, Member State liability
is directly rooted in Community law. 1 3 ' Nevertheless, the Court

WIDERSmEIT (1998); DIETER C. UMBAcH & THOMAS CLEMENS, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTsGESErZ: MITARBEITERKOMMENTAR UND HANDBUCH (1992).
129.
See B6hm, supra note 111, at 55, n.23 (explaining that protocol
declarations correcting the judgments could have sufficed since Francovich and
Brasserie were handed down before the Maastricht and Amsterdam
Intergovernmental Conferences, respectively).
130.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 777 (noting that this issue, which arose in
the wake of Francovich,may be relevant under the German Court Constitution Act
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz)for the applicability of the jurisdiction of civil courts,
as opposed to administrative courts, in expropriation and public tort liability
cases).
13 1.
Id. (referring to the ECJ's Brasseriejudgment). For the proposition that
general principles of international law associated with state responsibility provide
authority for the existence of state liability, see Chorzow Factory (F.R.G. v. Pol.),
1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 21 (July 26) (stating that "[i]t is a principle of
international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to
be stated in the convention itself."). The concept of an indemnification scheme
seated in supranational law is not novel. According to Article 13 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), everybody whose rights or freedoms under
the Convention are breached by persons acting in an official capacity is entitled to
an effective remedy before a national authority. See European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force Sept.
3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
See also Stephan Kopp, Staatshaftung fiar
gesetzgeberisches Unterlassen-Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH nach Francovich,
1997 NEUE JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIF 645, 645-46 (explaining that (1) Article 13
of the ECHR gives rise to an adequate indemnity or effective relief, without
imposing a punitive sanction against the member country in violation, (2) a
Swedish mother prevailed against the Kingdom of Sweden and won a liability
award of 200,000 Crowns because she had unlawfully been stripped off the
custody over her child, and (3) the national governments are closing statutory
gaps to ensure sufficient indemnification opportunities, as evidenced by an Italian
law granting indemnity for judicial procedures that last up to 30 or 40 years);
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RECOMMENDATION No. R (84) 15 OF THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS RELATING TO PUBLIC LIABILITY (adopted Sept. 18, 1984). Within the
federal system of the United States, causes of action for liability in damages have
also been recognized. See P. P. Craig, Once More Unto the Breach: The Community,
the State and Damages Liability, 113 LAw Q. REv. 67, 86 n.94 (explaining that (1)
damages liability for those who act pursuant to the state law, which violates the
Constitution, is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, according to Mitchum v.
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has simultaneously recognized that state liability may proceed on
the basis of national law under less restrictive requirements than
those demanded by Community law. l3 2 This jurisprudence of
setting minimum standards has been described as case law of
"directive-like character." 133 If municipal law recognized state
liability, the claim for damages would derive from that legal
system, albeit subject to the requirement that the interpretation
of domestic law conform to Community law standards.' 3

4

In

contrast, if national law did not allow for government liability,
direct

application

jurisprudence.
The

13 5

Court's

would

philosophical

be

accorded

rationale

and

to

the

solemn

ECJ's
tone

of

analysis describing the foundations of Member State liability are
strikingly reminiscent of its first-generation case law. 13 6
The
doctrines of supremacy, direct effect, and state liability all flow
from the general system, spirit, and fundamentals of the EC
Treaties. More specifically, these features arise from the nature
of Community law as a novel legal order sui generis enveloping
both the Member States and individuals,' 3 7 the principles of "full

Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), "interpose[s] the federal courts between the
States and the people, as the guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under the color of state law whether that
action be executive, legislative, or judicial," and (2) liability in damages against
federal officers who infringe the Constitution stems from the principle that
protection for constitutional rights demanded, under certain circumstances, a
monetary remedy).
132.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 777 (invoking Brasserie once more).
133.
Id. (using the term richtliniendhnlicherCharakte .
134.
See id. (noting that Article 5(3) of the EC Treaty precludes an
exhaustive regulation of state liability by Community law, since Community
measures may not exceed what is necessary to attain the treaty goals, and
concluding that Germany may incur liability according to German state liability
laws, including Art. 34 GG in conjunction with § 839 BGB, which would have to
be interpreted in conformity with Community law).
135.
See id at 777-78 (stating that the ECJ's case law establishes the
liability requirements in a sufficiently clear and precise manner as well as
guarantees the enforcement of subjective rights).
136.
See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport -en Expeditie Ondememing
van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1,
[19631 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (establishing the doctrine of direct effect, which enables
individuals to invoke Community law before their national courts); Case 6/64,
Costa v. Ente Nazionale per lPEnergia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] 3
C.M.L.R. 425 (fostering the supremacy principle, which establishes the primacy of
Community law over conflicting national law).
137.
See Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic,
1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5413, [19931 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 113 (supporting the rise of
Member State liability with the following considerations, including that (1) "the
[EC] Treaty has created its own legal system, which is integrated into the legal
systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply," (2)
"[t]he subjects of that legal system are not only the Member States but also their
nationals,' and (3) the rights conferred upon individuals by Community law "arise
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effectiveness" 3 8s and "equivalence"' 3 9 postulated by the
Community legal system, and the duty of sincere cooperation

not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty but also by virtue of
obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined manner both on
individuals and on the Member States and the Community institutions"). See also
Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport -en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend &
Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12-13, [19631 2 C.M.L.R. at 129 (basing direct effect of
Community law on the following lines of reasoning, including that (1) "[t]he
objective of the [EC] Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community,
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual
obligations between the contracting states;" (2) "the Community constitutes a new
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals;" (3) "[ilndependently of
the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which
become part of their legal heritage;" (4) "[t]hese rights arise not only where they
are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the
Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the
Member States and upon the institutions of the Community," and (5) "[t]he
vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective
supervision"); Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593-94, [19641 3 C.M.L.R. at 455-57
(providing the following reasons for supremacy of Community law, including (1)
"[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its
own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral
part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound
to apply;" (2)
[b]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers
from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body
of law which binds both their nationals and themselves;
and (3)
the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic
legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character
as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself
being called into question.
138. The effet utile doctrine holds that it falls to the national courts to
ensure the full effectiveness of Community law within their jurisdiction and make
an effective remedy available for the enforcement of Community law conferring
rights upon individuals. See JOSEPHINE STEINER, ENFORCING EC LAW 43-44 (1995)

(explaining that the effectiveness principle protects individuals and deters parties
from breaching Community law). See also Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993
2 C.M.L.R. 66 (reasoning that (1) "[t]he full effectiveness of Community rules
would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be
weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are
infringed by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held
responsible;" and (2)
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imposed upon the Member States and the EC.14 The
introduction of state liability reflects the ECJ's commitment to
integration through the reinforcement of subjective rights of the
14
vigilant individual. 1

[tihe possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly
indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community
rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where,
consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce
before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community
law;
Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame
Ltd, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, 1-2457-58, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (reasoning that the effet
utile principle derives from the principle of cooperation under Article 10 of the EC
Treaty); Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629, 643, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 282-83 (explaining that
national judges may be under a duty to set aside national legislative provisions
which may prevent Community rules from unfolding full force and effect); Case
222/86, Union nationale des entraineurs et Cadres techniques professionels du
football (Unectef) v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, 4117, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 901, 913
(emphasizing that "the existence of a remedy of a judicial nature against any
decision of a national authority . . . is essential in order to secure for the
individual effective protection for his [sic] right"); Case 22/84, Johnston v. Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, 1682, [1986] 3
C.M.L.R. 240, 262 (1986) (observing that the "requirement of judicial control ...
reflects a general principle of law which underlies the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States [and which] is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 4 November 1950").
139. The equivalency or assimilation principle requires that the remedy
must be equivalent to a comparable internal right of action. See Oliver, supra note
2, at 637; Nicholas Emiliou, State Liability under Community Law: Shedding More
Light on the Francovich Principle?,21 EUR. L. REv. 399, 407 (1996).
140. See Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5414, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 114
(referring to the solidarity bond of Article 10 of the EC Treaty which, according to
the Court, imposes on the Member States the obligation to nullify the unlawful
consequences of a breach of Community law). See also Norbert Reich, Der Schutz
subjektiver Gemeinschaftsrechte durch Staatshaftung, 7 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 709 (1996) (characterizing Article 10 of the EC Treaty as a
lever to constitutionalize Community law in the context of protecting subjective
rights interests); Oliver, supra note 2, at 638 (identifying Article 10 of the EC
Treaty, the concept of direct effect, and human rights as the three distinct bases
of law underlying the principle of state liability).
141.
See Reich, supra note 140, at 710 (explaining that the ECJ adopted
Jellinek's concept of subjective public-law rights (subjektive 6ffentliche Rechte)),
Dutheil de la Roch~re, supra note 111, at 8 (speaking of a "formidable new
weapon" of "private punishment).
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C. Contours of Member State Liability

1. Alignment with Non-Contractual Liability of the Community
The ECJ generally aligns the system of Member State liability
for breaches of Community law with the standards governing
non-contractual liability incurred by the Community under
Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty. 142 The Court's rationale consists
in achieving a high degree of coherence within the Community
legal system. 14 3 The linkage allows the ECJ to use a regulatory
44
model created by the contracting parties themselves.
Community liability, which originates from the common core of
fundamental principles prevailing in the legal orders of the
Member States, 145 bounces back into the Community legal
system and provides the framework for state liability claims
against Member States for breaches of Community law. 146 This
approach of cross-fertilization and constant replenishment may
ultimately gravitate toward a jus commune state liability
regime. 14 7
The ECJ caveat that certain circumstances may

142.
See, e.g., B8hm, supra note 111, at 55 n.26 (observing that in its
Francovich decision, the ECJ did not mention Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty,
despite the respective proposition by Advocate General Mischo); Streinz, supra
note 119, at 202 (observing that the ECJ does not use Article 288(2) of the EC
Treaty in analogy but rather as an appropriate reference framework).
143.
See, e.g., B6hm, supra note 111, at 55 (invoking the image of a full
loop); Dutheil de la Roch~re, supra note 111, at 14 (using also the term
.congruity').
144.
See, e.g., B6hm, supra note 111, at 55; Dutheil de la Rochire, supra
note 111, at 14.
145.
See Ton Heukels & Alison McDonnell, The Action for Damages in a
Community Law Perspective:Introduction, in THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN COMMUNITY
LAW, supra note 111, at 1, 3 (explaining that "[t]his general reference to the
Member States' legal systems has proved to be a rich source of inspiration and
legitimacy for the [ECJ] in tracing and developing precise criteria governing ...
non-contractual liability").
146.
See B6hm, supra note 111, at 55.
147.
See, e.g., Roberto Caranta, JudicialProtection Against Member States: A
New Jus Commune Takes Shape, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 703 (1995); Walter van
Gerven, Bridging the Gap Between Community and National Laws: Towards a
Principleof Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies?, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
679 (1995); Walter van Gerven, Non-Contractual Liability of Member States,
Community Institutions and Individualsfor Breaches of Community Law with a View
to a Common Law for Europe, 1 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 6 (1994);. But see
JO0rgen Schwarze, Tendencies Towards a Common Administrative Law in Europe, 16
EUR. L. REV. 3 (1991) (opining that, paradoxically, the Court has had to build this
common model itself, since there were no principles common to the laws of the
Member States in this area); Streinz, supra note 119, at 202 (observing a recent
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warrant a deviation from the model,' 4 8 however, does not specify
any indicators that would suggest decoupling the question of
Member State liability from Community non-contractual
49
liability.1

Several commentators in the legal literature have welcomed
the alignment between the two liability systems.' 5 0 Others have
rejected the linkage, arguing that the foundations of Member
State liability and Community non-contractual liability are
different.151 Moreover, the rules pertaining to scenarios of
Community non-contractual liability have been characterized as
woefully inadequate.' 5 2 Theoretical options for a government

tendency of the ECJ to advance "coherence arguments" (Kohdrenzargumente)and
'communitarize" national law serving to execute Community law).
148.
See Oliver, supra note 2, at 649 (explaining that the ECJ seeks to avoid
any double standards, since nobody can predict all future case scenarios).
149.
See id. at 649 n.36 (asking whether, in light of recent case law,
national courts may be required to make available interim relief granting
provisional damages in Member State liability actions). For a decision handed
down by the ECJ, on appeal of a Court of First Instance judgment, see Case C393/96 P(R), Antonissen v. Council & Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 1-441, 1-454-55,
[1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 783, 792
(stating that the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction to grant provisional damages by way of interim measure in
proceedings brought pursuant to Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty, in exceptional
cases where the prima facie case is especially strong and the urgency particularly
evident). See generally Mark Hoskins, The Relationship Between an Action for
Damages and the Award of Interim Measures, in THE AcTION FOR DAMAGES IN
COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 111, at 259.
150.
See, e.g., Streinz, supranote 119, at 202; B6hm, supranote 111, at 5758.
151.
See, e.g., Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food exparte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553, 2588, [1996] 2
C.M.L.R. 391, 429 (providing Advocate General Leger's assessment that the
"Member States are subject to a hierarchy of legal norms which does not exist in
the Community"); Waelbroeck, supra note 111, at 311 (explaining that the liability
triggers of both systems do not closely dove tail); Emiliou, supra note 139, at 408
(observing that the
Community institutions, and in particular the Community legislature, will
often act in a field which is characterized by the exercise of wide discretion
whereas the national legislature, when acting o[r] failing to act in a sphere
of activity which comes within the ambit of Community law, rarely
possesses discretionary powers as wide as those of the Community
legislator;
Walter van Gerven, Bridging the Unbridgeable: Community and National Tort Laws
After Francovich and Brasserie, 45 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 507 (1996) (describing a
discrepancy in determining the quantum of damages under both liability regimes);
Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte
Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553, 1-2581, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 391,
423 (1996) (presenting Advocate General Leger's use of the term "illogicality").
152.
See Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedley Lomas
(Ireland)Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2588 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 430 (containing Advocate
General Leger's statement that it would be somewhat paradoxical to align state
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liability scheme include adopting a test of strict liability based on
a finding of illegality,' 5 3 shaping a fault criterion,' 5 4 requiring
proof of a serious breach of the relevant Community norm,1 5 5 and
imposing liability only under exceptional circumstances or not at
all.15 6 The following passages will discuss the criteria established
by the ECJ.
2. Criteria
Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty prescribes the comparative
legal method for deciding non-contractual liability cases.' s 7 Over
the years the ECJ has used this unique feature of Community
law,' 5 8 whereas high courts in other jurisdictions have exhibited

liability for breach of Community law with the rules pertaining to Article 288(2) of
the EC Treaty, which are judged to be unsatisfactory, unduly stringent and
affording insufficient protection to effective judicial relief, at least with regard to
the condition concerning breach of Community law). For an example of case law
considered as deficient, see Case C-282/90, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming
VreugdenhilBVv. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 1-1937, 1-1968, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 803,
827 (rejecting the claim for damages in a scenario where a Community regulation,
which had to be enacted by the Council, was adopted by the Commission,
because, according to the ECJ, "the aim of [the system of the division of powers
between the various Community institutions] is to ensure that the balance
between institutions provided for in the Treaty is maintained, and not to protect
individuals").
See also Francette Fines, A General Analytical Perspective on
Community Liability, in THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note
111, at 11, 23 (observing a trend of "real worsening of the treatment of
individuals"); STEINER, supra note 138, at 153 (describing the dichotomy between
the high substantive thresholds and the relatively unproblematic standing
requirements in proceedings under Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty). But see
Oliver, supranote 2, at 650 (wondering whether the Brasserieruling "might herald
a more liberal approach to Article [288(2) of the EC Treaty], as the Court may be
under pressure from litigants to place . . . [its] case law [pertaining to the
Community's non-contractual liability] on the same footing as that on state
liability).
153.
See Craig, supra note 131, at 79.
154.
See id. at 75-76 (explaining that (1) in different legal systems fault has
been distinct meanings, (2) civil law systems tend to equate fault with illegality, (3)
the common law differentiates fault from illegality, and (4) fault may also connote
subjective elements, including intent or some form of consciousness).
155.
See i. at 79.
156.
See id.
157.
See Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Gedanken zum Entstehen einer
Europdischen Rechtsordnung, 1999 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1, 6
(emphasizing that the framers of the EC Treaty refer to "the principles common to
the laws of the Member States," as opposed to "the law," giving the ECJ a wide
degree of latitude for performing this task).
158.
See id. at 8 (explaining that (1) the ECJ has its own legal research
department, (2) the Court's deliberations often include a comparative legal
research component, and (3) the ECJ's judgments rarely reflect this exercise, but
noting that the various legal systems differ more in procedure than in actual
substance). For an example of the use of comparative legal analysis pertaining to
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a general reluctance to explore this type of analytical tool. 15 9 A
comparative glance through the tort laws1 60 of the Member States
canvassing their common core yields three basic elements of a
general tort: (1) an unlawful act or omission imputable to the
tortfeasor, (2) actual damage sustained by the injured party, and
(3) a causal link between the conduct and the damage. 16 1
Nevertheless, the Court routinely cautions that the specific
requirements for the rise of state liability depend on the type of
violation of Community law leading to the damage.' 6 2 Therefore,
the evolution of the conditions governing Member State liability
does not seem surprising.
The Francovich decision, which involves a Member State's
complete failure to transpose a Community directive within the
required implementation period, established three requirements.1 6 3 First, the results prescribed by the directive must
entail the grant of rights to individuals.' 6 4 Moreover, it must be
possible to identify the contents of these rights on the basis of the
provisions of the directive.' 6 5 Finally, a causal link must exist
between the breach of the Member State's obligation and the loss
and damage suffered by the injured parties.' 6 6 Francovichoffers
the "unusual feature"' 6 7 that the judicial genesis of Member State
liability is preceded by the Court's aborted direct effect analysis
with respect to the provisions of the directive in the first part of

the revocation of an administrative act, which has conferred subjective rights
upon the addressee, see Joined Cases 7/56 & 3 to 7/57, Algera v. Common
Assembly of the European Coal d Steel Community, 1957 E.C.R. 39.
159.
See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (involving a
federal law that forced the police of the states to perform checks on potential
weapons buyers). The dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer afT-med the requisite
federal power making reference to the "federal systems" of Switzerland, Germany,
and the European Union. See id. at 976. However, the majority opinion, which
was written by Justice Scalia, rejected this comparative law approach as
"inappropriate" for interpreting the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 921 n. 11.
160.
Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury, ex parte British
Telecommunications plc, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1631, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 217 (including
Advocate General Tesauro's derivation of the rise of state liability from the rule of
law (Rechtsstaa.
161.
See David Edward & William Robinson, Is There a Placefor Private Law
Principlesin Community Law?, in THE AcTION FOR DAMAGES INCOMMUNITY LAW, supra
note 111, at 339, 343 (invoking, in support of the proposition that private law
ideas are increasingly invading Community law, the common law of negligence
and the triad under Aquilian liability of (1) damnum, (2) iniuria,and (3) datum).
162.
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic,
1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5415, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 114.
163.
See id.
164.
See id.
165.
See id.
166.
See id.
167.
Oliver, supranote 2, at 639.
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the judgment. 168 By preserving the first two steps in the direct
effect analysis 16 9 and replacing the failed element with a
requirement of causation, the Court arrives at Member State
liability. 170 This transition appears to have been facilitated by
"equity" considerations and the nature of the right at issue.
Insolvency protection claims are "secondary" in character,
because they are designed to compensate for the employers'
incapacity to meet their "primary" obligation of paying due
salaries to their employees. 17 1 This may seem to approximate
claims for damages and their "compensatory" rationale.
17 2
Independent of the specific features underlying the case,
Francovich suggests that Member State liability is triggered in
cases where direct effect of a directive is foreclosed because the
rights are not conferred vis-A-vis the State. In lieu of recognizing
horizontal direct effect of directives, the Court opts for the rise of
a liability claim against the State.' 73

168.
See Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991
E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5408 [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 109 (recalling its case law postulating
direct effect of directives and, in accordance with the nature of the right at issue,

the Court performing the standard direct effect test for each constituent element
of the insolvency protection claim, including (1) the identity of the persons
entitled, (2) the content of the guarantee, and (3) the identity of the person liable).
169. See id. at 1-5411 (finding that the identity of the persons entitled and
the contents of the guarantee are provided in a sufficiently clear, precise, and
unconditional manner).
170. See id. at 1-5411-13 (reasoning that the provisions of the directive do
not identify the person liable to provide the guarantee and the State can not be
considered liable on the sole ground that it had failed to transpose the
Community directive within the prescribed period).
171. See id. at 1-5405 (characterizing the directive as being designed to
guarantee employees a minimum level of protection in the event of their
employer's insolvency).
172. For the proposition that direct effect may emerge under different
guises, see, for example, Case 148/78, Pubblico Mimistero v. Tulio Ratti 1979
E.C.R. 1629 (presenting the defendant's use of direct effect as a criminal defense);
Case 152/84, M. H. Marshall v. Southampton & South-West HampshireArea Health
Authority (Teaching) (Marshall4), 1986 E.C.R. 723 (featuring direct effect of gender
equality rights).
173. See B6hm, supra note 111, at 58 n.73. See also Waelbroeck, supra
note 111, at 317 (observing that (1) the ECJ's state liability jurisprudence will
further the force of directives, in particular by compensating for their lack of
horizontal direct effect, (2) pursuant to horizontal direct effect a public sector
employee can claim rights under non-implemented directives against a state,
whereas a private sector employee cannot proceed against a private employer, and
(3) the rise of state liability enables the private sector employee to sue the state for
damages); Reich, supranote 140, at 710 (explaining that (1) in contrast to primary
Community law and the regulation which may produce direct effect ex lege, the
directive merely enjoys "limping direct effects," (2) state liability fills the gaps in
the direct effect doctrine when it comes to directives that have not been
transposed in toto, in time, or quite correctly, and (3) the Member State then acts
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Brasserie and successive decisions further develop the
somewhat cryptic Francovich set of requirements.17 4 In addition
to clarifying that direct effect and state liability are legal aliuds,175
the ECJ fashions the set of conditions for state liability more
explicitly like a tort claim without considering its approach to be
chiseled in stone.17 6 As discussed earlier, the Court prescribes a
trio of elements. 177 The ECJ continues to require that the rule of
Community law breached must be intended to confer rights upon
individuals. 178
Moreover, the breach must be sufficiently
serious.1 79 Finally, the breach and the damage sustained by the
individuals must have a direct causal link.18 O While the first and

as a "residual debtor" flowing from guarantee obligations under Articles 10 and
249 of the EC Treaty).
174.
Emiliou, supra note 139, at 400 (observing that Francovich left open a
number of particularly significant issues, including the relationship between state
liability and direct effect, the relevance of the concept of fault, the connection
between Member State and Community liability, and the harmonization effect of
the judgment on the national legal orders of the Member States).
175.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1142, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 985 (qualifying direct effect as
a minimum guarantee). The availability of Member State liability is not contingent
on the existence of direct effect nor does it require its foreclosure but serves an
independent means of redress for wrongful government conduct. Thus, an action
for Member State liability may be brought independent or instead of a complaint
based on direct effect. See also Case C-271/91, M. H. Marshall v. Southampton
and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Marshall II), 1993 E.C.R. I4367 (holding that a national measure imposing a ceiling on the compensation
pursuant to the directive was unlawful because the maximum sum in question
was not adequate to ensure real equality of opportunity in all cases). But see id. at
1-4391 (presenting Advocate General van Gerven's opinion that such a ceiling was
lawful if it was fixed at a sufficiently high level to ensure its "effective, uniform,
and deterrent nature"). In certain instances it may actually be advisable to also
advance a claim for damages based on Member State liability. See, e.g., Emiliou,
supra note 139, at 406 (referring to scenarios of uncertainties pertaining to the
scope of "state" in light of the limitation that, according to the ECJ, a provision of
an EC directive only produces vertical direct effect).
176.
See Gerrit Betlem, The King Can Do Wrong: State Liability for Breach of
European Community Law in the Post-Francovich Era, 4 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES (Sept. 30, 1996) <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue4/betlem4.html>
(describing the Brasserie liability regime comparable to the "conceptual" Dutch
and French approaches, in contrast to the situation-based German and English
liability systems). For a primer of Dutch law, see INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR
FOREIGN LAWYERS (Jeroen Chorus et al. eds., 2d. rev. ed. 1993). For a comparative
law perspective, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 3d. rev. ed. 1998).
177.
See Brasserie du Pdcheur SA, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1149, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. 889, 989 (1996).
178.
See id
179.
See id.
180.
See id.
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third conditions' s i are virtually identical to the Francovich test,
the modified second element of the Brasserie liability test
establishes a bright line for imputing breaches of Community law
to the Member State on the basis of the degree of unlawfulness
involved.' 8 2 Determining whether a sufficiently serious breach of
Community law has occurred will most likely constitute the
central issue posed in state liability cases. The Court proposes
the following roadmap.
Infringements of Community law in
scenarios not involving discretion shall automatically be
considered serious, thus triggering liability without further
analysis.' 8 3
Situations characterized by an ample margin of
discretion, however, shall be evaluated by applying a more
extensive rule of reason.1 8 4 According to the ECJ, a sufficiently
serious breach arises ff the bounds of discretion are manifestly

181.
See, e.g., B~hm, supra note 111, at 58 (observing that the first
requirement of the breached norm conferring rights upon individuals will always
be considered to be satisfied in the case directly effective provisions of Community
law); Oliver, supra note 2, at 651 (reconfirming that the first condition "is
automatically met . . . whenever the rule is enshrined in a directly applicable
provision of Community law"). See also Ehlers, supra note 9, at 778 (proposing to
re-phrase the first condition that the breached Community norm must embody a
subjective right or intend to confer rights in a sufficiently concrete manner). But
see Oliver, supra note 2, at 651 (noting that the Court, in deviation from its
jurisprudence pertaining to Community non-contractual liability, has abandoned
the requirement that the rule breached must be "for the protection of the
individual" by substituting it with the less onerous criterion that the rule in
question must 'confer rights on individuals"). For ECJ case law involving Article
288 of the EC Treaty and highlighting the strict threshold modeled after the
German protective-norm theory (Schutznormtheorie), which stipulates that the
norm allegedly violated is designed to protect the interests of the applicant, see,
for example, Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90, Mulder v. Council and Commission,
1992 E.C.R. 1-3061; Case 5/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Sch6ppenstedt v. Council, 1971
E.C.R. 975. For a discussion of the causation requirement, see Reich, supra note
140, at 714 (explaining that (1) the ECJ requires direct causal connection and
takes the defense of overtaking causation under strict scrutiny, (2) the causation
prong serves to exclude merely indirect consequences of the infringement from the
state liability principle, and (3) a comparison between the hypothetical conditions
under a Community law-conform scenario (Sollzustand) and the actual situation
in light of the infringement (Istzustand) is sufficient to prevent the causation
requirement from becoming a factual liability obstacle).
182.
See Dutheil de la Roch~re, supra note 111, at 14 (calling this criterion
the 'harmonized" condition).
183.
See Emiliou, supra note 139, at 408 (speaking of a mere breach, or
breach sinpliciter, including the clear-cut violation of a precise "obligation de
rdsultatl. See also Ehlers, supranote 9, at 778 (stating that the transposition of
unambiguous directives does not involve any appreciable discretion).
184.
See Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury, ex parte British
Telecommunications plc, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1631, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 217 (illustrating
that discretion emerges in instances of imprecise Community law requirements).
See also Ehlers, supra note 9, at 778 (explaining that such a situation may also
arise in the case of a directive).
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and gravely disregarded.1 8 5 In light of the open, normative
nature of these criteria, the ECJ suggests the use of factors to
distill obvious and severe infringements of Community law by a
86
Member State.'
The ECJ's overall set of conditions may appear rigid and
mechanistic. The Court, however, injects an element of elasticity
into its system by distinguishing cases according to the type and
margin of discretion featured in a particular scenario. The
determination and evaluation of circumstances involving
discretion may require the exercise of judgment, especially in
light of the factors offered by the ECJ to facilitate the analysis.
The ECJ's tailored approach, which may stem from an overall
hesitation to open Pandora's liability box too widely,' 8 7 has been
described as "relatively unrefined"' 8 8 and "unnecessarily
complex."' 8 9 With regard to the liability standard, the majority of
commentators have advocated lowering the bar toward strict

185.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du P~cheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1148, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 988.
186. See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 778 (opining that the ECJ's guidance
assists in determining the evidence of the breach, whereas its severity is not
further pursued). The ECJ's factor approach has led several commentators to
emphasize that the ECJ's guidance for Member State liability actions and the
Court's historic considerations in non-contractual liability cases brought against
the Community do not jibe. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 2, at 651 (recalling that
under Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty the ECJ requires the flagrant violation of a
"superior rule of law" when the Community legislative action involves a wide
margin of discretion. "[The word 'superior' creates the impression that some
rules of law are not sufficiently important for their breach to give rise to liability in
damages"); Brasserie du PdcheurSA, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-1107, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at
959 (providing Advocate General Tesauro's observation that the term superior is
"tautologous" because it would be logically impossible to infringe a rule of law
which is not superior); Ehlers, supra note 9, at (observing that Community noncontractual liability may be triggered in instances where (1) the number of
commercial operators is clearly delimited, (2) the damage sustained exceeds the
normal bounds of risk inherent in the sector-specific activity, and (3) violations of
primary Community law, especially fundamental rights, occur).
187. See Betlem, supra note 176 (explaining that the Court could not be
expected to accept a new state liability regime without initial restrictions); Streinz,
supra note 119, at 203 (reasoning that (1) the seriousness criterion may be
problematic, (2) it opens the door for a non-fault defense if Community law is
unclear, and (3) the restrictive design of the requirements constituted the reason
for the ECJ's rejection of Germany's general request to limit the temporal effects
of the present judgment).
188. Oliver, supra note 2, at 653 (rephrasing the Court's differentiation
previously described as a distinction "between (i) legislative measures involving
choices of economic policy and a wide margin of discretion and (ii) other
measures").
189. Betiem, supra note 176 (observing that "[l]ess appealing about the
newly established Brasserie regime is its incongruity between the fundamental
principles of and the actual prerequisites for liability").
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liability.19 °
Others have espoused setting a high liability
threshold. 19 1 Intermediate approaches have proposed replacing
the ECJ's test with a sliding scale of imputability ranging from
intentional conduct to non-fault risk-bearing. 19 2 Alternatively,
categories varying according to the seriousness of each
infringement have been suggested. 193
Less conceptual
approaches have developed thematic groupings, either capturing
qualitatively potential liability triggers 19 4 or, in the alternative,
extrapolating the central headnotes from liability decisions

190.
See Craig, supra note 131, at 79-81 (identifying two strands to this
approach as (1) the design of the standard for non-contractual liability incurred by
the Community has itself been subject to criticism, and (2) the rationale for the
high threshold underlying non-contractual Community liability does not apply
where the defendant is a Member State, as opposed to the Community). But see
id. at 80-84 (presenting the counter arguments that (1) a strict liability approach
would be inappropriate because
[t]he fact that a court might interpret complex discretionary provisions
differently from the primary decision-maker, and thereby conclude that the
decision is vitiated by illegality on the grounds of irrelevancy, impropriety
of purpose or the like, should not be sufficient without more to render the
public purse liable for what might be considerable sums of money
and (2) the exercise of all species of discretion, including the often not clearly
distinguishable implemenational and interpretative discretion alike, should not be
suffocated at the level of Community institutions nor in the case of domestic
agencies, which share in having to evaluate broad and complex scenarios).
191.
See id. at 84-85 (stating that (1) few voices supported a more limited
liability for Member States than the Community itself, (2) the ECJ's test was the
'best ... the Member States could have hoped for," (3) a lower bar would preclude
recovery in most instances, and (4) the state liability is designed to provide an
incentive for Member States to comply with Community law).
192.
See id. at 86 (expressing confusion about the use of discretion in a
double function of potentially triggering the elaborate determination of a manifest
and grave breach, while simultaneously serving as a factor within that analysis).
193.
See van Gerven, supra note 151, at 521 (explaining that breaches of
duty simpliciter or obligation de rgsultat, breaches consisting of the
misinterpretation of sufficiently precise and reasonably clear Community rules, as
well as breaches consisting in the misinterpretation of open-ended notions and
general principles which lend themselves to considerable scope for interpretation,
are-absent bona fide misunderstanding in interpretational settings-in
themselves sufficient to establish liability, whereas breaches of ambiguous or
misleading Community rules and breaches committed in the exercise of broad
discretionary powers, require manifest and grave disregard before liability
engages).
194.
See Hans D. Jarras, Haftung filr die Verletzung von EU-Recht durch
nationale Organeund Amtstrdger, 1994 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 881, 884
(providing as examples of Member State liability triggers (1) breaching directly
effective Community law, including provisions of a directive, (2) not or deficiently
applying Community regulations, (3) applying national implementation law in
contravention of a Community directive, and (4) interpreting national law in nonconformity with Community law).

346

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:311

already handed down by the ECJ. 195 Academic commentaries in
the wake of Brasserie have not been confined to the conditions of
Member State liability. The following passages discuss selected
issues, which, while not within the actual scope of that decision,
may further occupy the courts in the future.
3. Issues for Further Discussion
a. Other Forms of State Action as Potential Liability Triggers
The ECJ's approach of attributing the conduct of all State
organs and agencies to the Member State is scarcely novel. 19 6 In
Brasserie, the Court includes breaches of Community law by the
legislature' 9 7 and counters the concern that the specter of
liability litigation may deter legislative operations into paralysis
by differentiating according to the margin of discretion accorded

195.
See Emiliou, supra note 139, at 405 (citing (1) British Telecom for
covering a timely, yet bona fide incorrect partial implementation of a directive, (2)
Lomas for involving an individual decision by the national administration in
breach of a directly effective Treaty provision, and (3) FactortameIll and Brasserie
for addressing a legislative act and a legislative omission that previous ECJ
rulings held incompatible with directly effective Treaty provisions); Betlem, supra
note 176 (classifying Francovich and Dillenkofer under "Type A" or strict liability,
and British Telecom, Brasserie, Factortame11T,
and Hedley Lomas under a "Type B"
or "MSB" (manifest and serious breach) liability standard).
196. See Emiliou, supranote 139, at 407 (confirming that "[t]his approach is
in line with the Court's case law under Article [226] [of the] EC [Treaty] according
to which a Member State is responsible for a failure to fulfil [sic] an obligation
under the Treaty irrespective of which State agency is responsible for it, 'even in
the case of a constitutionally independent institution."); Craig, supra note 131, at
68-69 (explaining that the Court used a "unitary conception of the state" based on
hierarchical, international law, and "contractarian" rationales). See also Andrew
Geddes, Claims for Damages Against the State, 146 NEW L.J. 451, 452 (1996)
(explaining that public authorities within the meaning of "state" may include all
local authorities and State-controlled bodies); see Betlem, supra note 176 (noting
that this may include municipalities and public undertakings).
197. For arguments to include "legislative injustice" as potential liability
triggers, see, for example, Jarras, supranote 194, at 884 (arguing that the liability
sanction is especially important in cases of breaches of Community law by
national legislatures, since it is more difficult to control the application and
implementation of Community law than monitoring the transposition of
directives); Dutheil de la Roch~re, supra note 111, at 10 (arguing that "[t]he
election by universal suffrage does not confer to the parliament any special right
to escape from its obligation to comply with EC law"); Streinz, supra note 119, at
605 (dispensing with the requirement of a previous ECJ declaration that the
Member State has breached Community law). See also Waelbroeck, supra note
111, at 321 (explaining that the traditional view that regards the legislative
authority as sovereign based on separation-of-power considerations may not hold
true for the modem, multi-layer government).
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to the legislature. 1 98
The ruling, however, does not address
"administrative injustice" (Verwaltungsunrecht),19 9 because the
Court was bound by the BGH's reference. 2 0° In Hedley Lomas 20 1
and Brinkmann,20 2 which involve determinations by executive
authorities, the ECJ confirmed the three basic elements of its
state liability test.
In addition to the issue of ascertaining the meaning of
"administrative" or "executive," 20 3 the legal literature discusses
factors that may be uniquely tied to this type of injustice
scenario. Some academic circles postulate that state liability
should only be considered if national authorities are under a
duty, as opposed to a merely optional competence, to set aside
national law that potentially infringes Community law. 20 4 Those
who would impose a duty on administrative authorities to
disregard national law that breaches primary Community law
argue that the ECJ has consistently held that Community law

198.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pacheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1147-48, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 988-89. See also B6hm,
supra note 111, at 58 (supporting the ECJ's rationale). But see Jan-as, supra note
194, at 885 (identifying the significant risks for the Member States).
199.
Ehlers, supra note 9, at 778.
200.
See B6hm, supranote 111, at 60. See also Streinz, supra note 119, at
202 (observing that the ECJ would not have had to address legislative injustice if
one assumes an obligation of national authorities to ignore domestic law in
conflict with Community law, even absent a legislative change).
201.
The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte
Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553, 1-2613 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 391,
448 (holding that in a case of ministerial action the United Kingdom 'was not
called upon to make any legislative choices and had only considerably reduced, or
even no, discretion"). See also Craig, supra note 131, at 75 (reading this passage
to mean "that because the E.C.J. found there was neither a legislative choice, nor
any real discretion, therefore an infringement of Community law could per se be
sufficient to establish the existence of a serious breach for the purposes of
damages liability).
202.
Case C-319/96, Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v. Skatteministeriet,
1998 E.C.R. 1-5255, 1-5272, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 673, 691 (holding that the
interpretation of the directive at bar given by Danish authorities was "not
manifestly contrary" to Community law because it constituted one of a 'number of
perfectly tenable interpretations").
203.
See Craig, supra note 131, at 70-71 (observing that (1) the meaning of
"the executive" is contentious, (2) this issue will arise in relation to privatized
utilities which continue to retain a certain degree of monopoly status, agencies
contracted by the government to perform statutory powers and duties, and "other
bodies which exist at the fringes of the executive strictu sensu," (3) a body may be
considered part of the executive if it has been made responsible, pursuant to a
measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of
the state, and (4) the ECJ enunciated these "tripartite conditions" in Foster}.
204.
SeeB6hm, supranote 111, at 55.

348

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:311

enjoys supremacy over national law. 20 5 These commentators
invoke Member State obligations under the solidarity bond and
the principle of uniform application of Community law. 2 0 They
further note the ECJ's ruling that administrative authorities must
disregard national law that does not conform to Community
law. 20 7 Nevertheless, commentators opposing the rise of this
duty observe that this principle is not applied to domestic laws
within the national legal orders of the Member States. 20 8 They
emphasize that, under the EC Treaty, the national authorities do
not have recourse to the reference proceeding for a preliminary
ruling before the ECJ. 20 9 Moreover, according to these
commentators, the ECJ's jurisprudence is confined to imposing
this duty on national agencies in scenarios involving direct effect
of a Community directive. 2 10 This rationale, they caution, cannot
be expanded to breaches of the EC Treaty, because this would
contradict long-standing ECJ case law pertaining to potential
conflicts between secondary and primary Community law. 2 1 1 The
opponents of a duty to set aside national law conclude that the
administrative authorities are restricted to expressing their legal

205.
See id. at 56 (explaining that (1) the German Federal Constitutional
Court has interpreted this primacy as one of application, as opposed to validity,
and (2) the supremacy of Community law may bar conflicting German norms from
being applied, while not rendering them null and void, as well as relieve German
courts from their obligations under Art. 100(1) GG).
206. See id. at 60 (referring to Articles 10(2) and 249 of the EC Treaty, in
particular).
207. See, e.g., Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Commune di Milano,
1989 E.C.R. 1839, 1871 (establishing a duty of administrative authorities not to
apply national law that breaches Community directives); HANS D. JARRAS,
GRUNDFRAGEN DER INNERSTAATLICHEN BEDEUTUNG DES EG-REcHTs 102 (1994)
(stating that such a duty to set aside should be limited to national implementation
measures of grave legal deficiencies, and noting a contradiction within the ECJ's
case law that does not allow national authorities to set aside secondary
Community law allegediy breaching primary Community law).
208. See B~hm, supranote 111, at 55-6 (explaining that (1) according to the
prevailing opinion in the legal literature, German administrative agencies do not
have a duty nor a competence to set aside domestic law, (2) post-constitutional
formal statutes cannot be set aside by national authorities because they are
within the ambit of the control monopoly of the Federal Constitutional Court,
which protects the sovereignty of the parliamentary legislator, (3) decrees
(Rechtsverordnungen)and by-laws (Satzungen), which are substatutory measures,
cannot be disregarded by the authorities because of considerations involving
jurisdictional delineations and legal certainty, and (4) flagrant constitutional
infringements may result in a stay of the administrative process).
209.
See id. at 56 (explaining that Article 234(2) & (3) of the EC Treaty
confer upon the ECJ jurisdiction in reference proceedings initiated by "courts and
tribunals" only).
210. See id.
211.
See id. (explaining that in these cases the ECJ asserts its control
monopoly of holding secondary Community law invalid, which, by reasons of
separation of powers, is not granted to national agencies and courts).
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reservations, thereby enabling potentially concerned parties to
seek judicial review. 21 2 They add that the development of the
high abstraction level of the EC Treaty occurs in the "energy field"
between the Member States and the Community. 2 13 Finally, the
meticulously designed proceedings governing the control of an
alleged breach of Community law would be thwarted if, in the
absence of an ECJ decision, authorities were required or even
allowed to disregard national law that potentially infringes
primary Community law. 2 14 An alternative proposal does not
make this distinction between a duty and a competence to set
aside national law, but, along the lines suggested in Hedley
Lomas, advocates the adoption of the ECJ's narrowly tailored
conditions governing legislative injustice. 2 15 According to this
approach, however, certain scenarios may automatically trigger
state liability and not even require assessing the seriousness of
2 16
the breach.
The proposition of litigants pursuing claims for compensation
based on "judicial injustice" that stems from an alleged
misconstruction of Community law has not yet been tested. The
ECJ has indicated that state liability may exist for infringements
attributable to the judiciary. 2 17 In proceedings against Member
States for failures to fulfill obligations under Community law, the

212.
See id. (pleading for a uniform treatment of both sets of cases, although
the supremacy of Community law over national law differs from the hierarchical
primacy of primary over secondary Community law).
213.
See id. (stating that the implementation-oriented administrative bodies
cannot trump the Community institutions nor the national legislatures).
214.
See id. (explaining that (1) the process involves many imponderables
and complexities, (2) the Commission annually screens thousands of national
regulations against requirements of Community law and engages in a "continuous
dialogue" with Member States, (3) in less than five percent of these cases the
Commission initiates the procedure under Article 226 of the EC Treaty, and (4)
with the exception of evident infringements, a duty to set aside can only be
construed after the ECJ has handed down a judgment finding a national law in
breach of Community law).
215.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 778-79 (reasoning that the Court's overall
intent of preserving the legislature's freedom of decision-making would otherwise
be frustrated if Member States were to be held liable when executing national
statutory law through administrative measures that infringe Community law).
216.
See id. at 779 (referring to (1) deficient applications of national law
conforming to Community law and (2) other violations of Community law by
administrative measures that are not based on national law, as exemplified under
German state liability law in cases involving administrative warnings that do not
have a statutory basis and do not conform to German law).
217.
See generally Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Commune di
Milano, 1989 E.C.R. 1839. See also Craig, supra note 131, at 71-72 (observing
that (1) this feature "provides an important check upon national courts" and (2)
the specter may be raised when national courts opt to follow national law, as
opposed to supreme Community law, or choose to give an unduly restrictive
interpretation of Community law).
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Commission has generally exercised restraint vis-A-vis the
domestic also judicial branches.2 1 8 The trend in national legal
2 19
systems also reflects high-threshold requirements.
Finally, Community law is generally considered as "state
blind" because the Community's institutional balance equation
envelops the Member States independently from their political
subdivisions, including states and regions. 220 For example,
regions are not considered Member States for purposes of
privileged standing under the Community judicial review
system.2 2 1 Member States cannot plead their internal allocations
of powers to free themselves of their Community law
obligations. 2 2 2 Recently, the ECJ modified that reservation in the
area of Member State liability for breaches Community law and
held that, in Member States with a federal structure, the
reparation for damages need not necessarily be provided by the
federal state to fulfill that Member State's Community law
obligations, as long as the basic tenets of effectiveness and
2 23
equivalency are met.
b. National Measures Executing Potentially Unlawful Community
Legislation
The trio of Brasserieconditions may be interpreted to cover a
Member State's good faith execution of an act of the Council or
Commission, which is subsequently held unlawful. 22 4
Some
argue that the Member State does not commit an imputable
breach of law under these circumstances because the legislative

218. See Dutheil de la Rochere, supra note 111, at 11 (reasoning that "the
Commission has been anxious to preserve the independence of the judiciary").
219. See id. (explaining that French law, for example requires a serious
mistake in order to involve liability of the judiciary (faute lourde)).
220. In response to concerns about a loss of prerogatives raised by the
regions, through their Member States, the Framers of the Maastricht Treaty
created a new advisory body, the Committee of Regions, that is governed by
Articles 263 through 265 of the EC Treaty.
221. See Joined Cases 62 and 72/87, Executif regional wallon & SA
Glaverbel v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 1573, 1582.
222.
See, e.g., Case 52/75, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1976 E.C.R. 277
(concerning the legislative organs), Case 103/88, Fratelli Castanzo SpA v.
Commune di Milano, 1989 E.C.R. 1839 (involving the obligation of localities and
other territorial authorities to apply the provisions of directives).
223.
See Case C-319/96, Klaus Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1998 E.C.R. I5255 (involving a national liability law, which stipulates that in case of
infringements attributable to a part of the Member State, the injured party may
claim only liability against the subunit, as opposed to the Member State as a
whole).
224. See Oliver, supranote 2, at 654.
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measure is in force at the time of implementation. 22 S Others
advise that the injured parties must bring these types of actions
before the national courts and against the national authorities,
rather than petitioning the ECJ to take jurisdiction under the
rules
governing
the
non-contractual
liability
of
the
Community. 22 6 These commentators reason that indemnification
vehicles may constitute proper avenues allowing a bona fide
Member State to recover from the Community.2 2 7 Some of these
2 28
mechanisms may already exist for certain areas of the law.
Alternatively, a Member State may consider lodging a request for
payment of the sum with the Commission and, if the petition is
not fruitful, bring an action for failure to act against the
Commission. 2 2 9 Ascertaining potential liability of the Community,
however, may prove difficult. 23 0 According to the ECJ, a national
court cannot find that the Community has incurred noncontractual liability under the EC Treaty.2 3 '
Conversely,
litigation involving a defective Community act against national
authorities to circumvent the ECJ's prior dismissal of an action
for damages brought on identical grounds against the
23 2
Community may constitute an abuse of process.

225.
See Case 101/78, Granaria BV v. Hoofdproduktschap voor
Akkerbouwprodukten, 1979 E.C.R. 623, 644, [19791 3 C.M.L.R. 124, 138
(providing Advocate General Capotori's opinion that "the Member State has not
committed a wrongful act by implementing a regulation in force, even if it is
defective because it is at variance with higher rules of Community law"). See also
Oliver, supranote 2, at 654 (hinting at considerations of legal certainty).
226.
Oliver, supra note 2, at 654.
227.
See id.
228.
See id. at 654 & nn.58-59 (citing Council Regulation 729/70 on the
Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, 1970 O.J. SPEC. ED. 218; Council
Decision 94/728 on the Community's Own Resources 1994 O.J. (L 293) 9
(Euratom)).
229.
See id. at 654 n.59 (referencing Article 232 of the EC Treaty, which
establishes a pre-litigation and a judicial stage).
230.
For a detailed analysis of several crucial issues, see Peter Oliver, Joint
Liability of the Community and the Member States, in THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES IN
COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 111, at 285.
231.
See Case 101/78, Granaria BV v. Hoofdproduktschap voor
Akkerbouwprodukten, 1979 E.C.R. 623, 644, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 124, 134 (deciding
that 'a question relating to the application of the second paragraph of Article [288
of the EC Treaty] cannot be determined in proceedings under Article [234] of the
[EC] Treaty").
232.
See Oliver, supra note 2, at 655 (finding that such action against the
national authorities before the national courts "if successful . . . would have
[ultimately] resulted in the applicants being compensated by the Community after
all'). For an illustration of the ECJ's posture in a case featuring a Community
regulation pertaining to production aid for tomato concentrate, see Joined Cases
106 to 120/87, Asteris AE v. Hellenic Republic, 1988 E.C.R. 5515, 5539 (holding
that Article 288 of the EC Treaty "precludes a national authority which merely
implemented the Community legislative measure and was not responsible for its

352

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:311

c. Subsidiarity to Other Remedies
The Brasserie decision does not address the relationship
between the action for damages and other legal remedies that
may be in the quiver of the injured party.23 3 Those seeking to
treat the action for damages as subsidiary to other remedies
argue that a fledgling subsidiarity requirement may be embedded
in Brasserie when the Court imposes on the injured parties a
duty of applying reasonable care to mitigate their loss.23 4
A
mitigating measure may include seeking to have the contested
underlying measure quashed in due time. 23 5 The principal policy
rationale advanced in support of subsidiarity involves shifting the
injured parties into a mode of damage prevention and
containment as well as providing the authorities with the
23 6
opportunity to abort their unlawful conduct more speedily.

unlawfulness from being held liable on the same grounds"). The regulation had
previously been the subject of review in an actions for damages and annulment
before the ECJ. See Case 194 to 206/83, Asteris AE v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R.
2815 (dismissing the action for non-contractual liability because the unlawfulness
of the regulation did not rise to the level of constituting a flagrant violation of a
superior rule of law since it resulted from a merely technical error); Case 192/83,
Hellenic Republic v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 2791 (annulling a Community
regulation pertaining to production aid for tomato concentrates).
233.
See generally Oliver, supranote 2, at 652 (stating that while "the Court
held that the plaintiff owed a duty to take care to mitigate his [sic] loss, it did not
examine this particular issue"); Ehlers, supra note 9, at 779 (speaking of primary
legal review (Primnchtsschutz)).
234. See Oliver, supra note 2, at 652 (observing that the approach, "which
has much to commend it," "has yet to be endorsed by the Court"); see also Case
C-2/94, Denkavit International BV v. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabriken voor
Midden-Gelderland, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2827, 1-2852 (presenting (1) Advocate General's
Jacobs' characterization of State liability in damages "as a remedy [of exceptional
character] which goes beyond ordinary administrative remedies," and (2) the
Commission's point of view that the State liability action might be regarded as
ancillary to other remedies).
235. See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pacheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1119, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 974 (containing Advocate
General Tesauro's statement that "the Member States cannot be reasonably
debarred" from making the right to damages contingent on having brought an
action for annulment where available). See also Ehlers, supra note 9, at 783
(advocating that the individual constitutional complaint against anti-constitutional
laws be opened to encompass German statutes infringing Community law).
236. See Oliver, supra note 2, at 652 (referring to a regulatory model
provided by Article 839(3) BGB, "which precludes the recovery of damages for the
acts of public authorities where the plaintiff has 'deliberately or negligently failed
to avert loss by seeking another remedy"). Article 839(3) BGB reads, "Die
Ersatzpflicht tritt nicht ein, wenn der Verletzte vorsdtzlich oderfahrldssigunterlassen
hat, den Schaden durch Gebrauch eines Rechtsmittels abzuwendern" Id. at 653
n.53.
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This may be especially relevant in cases of "legislative injustice,"
2 37
which can involve considerable claims.
The ECJ seems to derive the injured party's duty of
mitigation from the principle of good faith common to the laws of
the Member States. 2 38
The Court apparently envisions
addressing the subsidiarity question as a matter of liability
consequences by assigning a degree of comparative fault to the
plaintiffs that do not avail themselves of primary legal
remedies.2 3 9 Nevertheless, the potential subsidiarity of the action
for damages is not limitless; the ECJ notes that the injured party
is not required to make unreasonable efforts for completely
24 °
exhausting all other remedies.
d. Quantum of Damages
Primary Community law does not provide any indication of
the calculation, amount, and types of compensable damages. As
previously discussed, the ECJ provides the adjudicating national
courts with a three-pronged guideline pertaining to the amount of
damages. The Court, however, does not further define the phrase
"commensurate with the loss or damage sustained" when

237.
Ehlers, supra note 9, at 779 (explaining that a primacy of other
remedies may specifically limit the amount of damages).
238.
But see id. (invoking the regulatory intent of Community law, which
entails the protection of fundamental freedoms through deflective rather than
compensatory legal remedies, and validating this line of reasoning against German
state liability law, which does not recognize (any more) a choice among remedies
according to the motto "defend yourself or cash in" (wehre dich oder liquidiere)).
239.
See i. (expressing, however, the preference of including a subsidiarity
requirement among the liability triggers, as opposed to addressing it as a
corrective in the subsequent stage of liability consequences).
See also Oliver,
supra note 2, at 653 (observing that "as Advocate General Tesauro pointed out,
the Court has arguably followed the same approach with respect to noncontractual liability under Article [288 of the EC Treaty]"). For ECJ case law
analyzing subsidiarity issues already in the admissibility stage of actions for
damages levied against the Community, see, for example, Case 5/71, AktienZuckerfabrik Sch6ppenstedt v. Councl, 1971 E.C.R. 975 (holding that the plaintiff's
legal interest is independent of an action for annulment against the contested
measure allegedly triggering the damages); Case 175/84, Krohn & Co. ImportExport (GmbH & Co. KG) v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 753, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 745
(holding the action admissible without the prior exhaustion of national remedies).
240.
See Brasserie du Pdcheur, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1157 [1996] 1 C.M.L.R.
889, 994. See also Reich, supra note 140, at 715 (providing the example that if a
national court, in the case of an incorrect transposition of a directive, cannot
correct the defect through a Community law-conform interpretation, then the
Member State has to fill the gap). But see Ehlers, supra note 9, at 779 (noting
that the uncertain outcome, high cost, or long duration of a complex case do not
reach the threshold of unreasonableness, which, although affrmed prematurely
in numerous German court cases, should be treated as a criterion of exceptional
character).
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addressing the extent of the reparation. 24 1 A glimpse at the
German language version of the decision 24 2 reveals the term
angemessen, whereas the French translation uses addquat. The
potential subtleties involved with the different language versions
of the judgment may suggest less than full restitutory
compensation. 243 Moreover, the Court does not offer a method of
calculation for the damages. 2 44 Finally, the ECJ's guidance
appears particularly cautious not to micro-manage the margin of
evaluation enjoyed by the national courts with respect to this
2 45
criterion.

241.
See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pacheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1156-57, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 971 (advising that (1) the
framework for Member State liability must not be disfavorable vis-a-vis
corresponding domestic claims, (2) the compensation for damages must be
commensurate with the loss suffered, and (3) the pursuit of the Member State
liability claim must not be rendered practically impossible or excessively difficult).
See also Ehlers, supra note 9, at 779 (further discussing the guidance elements
identified by the ECJ).
242.
See Brasserie du Pdcheur, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1131 (identifying
German and English as the "languages of the case"). Article 29 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and Article 35 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities govern the language of the case. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES art. 29, reprinted in KOEN
LENAERTS & DIRK ARTS, PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION app. 2 at 445-46
(Robert Bray ed., 1999); RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES art. 35, reprintedin LENAERTS & ARTS, supra, at app. 3
at 484-85.
243.
See Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and South West
Hampshire Area Health Authority (Marshall II), 1993 E.C.R. 1-4367, 1-4390, [1993]
3 C.M.L.R. 293 (presenting Advocate General van Gerven's explanation that the
.compensation must be adequate in relation to the damage sustained but does not
have to be equal thereto"). But see Oliver, supra note 2, at 656 (noting that "[t]he
Court appeared to reject this suggestion).
244.
For the damage calculation method under German law, see DIETER
MEDICUS, BORGERLICHES RECHT 604 (17th ed. 1996) (explaining that the German
Civil Code provides two options, that are both aimed at "total restitution"
(Totalrestitution):(1) "natural restitution" (Naturalrestitution)reflecting the injured
party's "integrity interest" (Integritdtsinteresse),and (2) "pecuniary compensation
(Geldersatz) equivalent to "value interest" (Wertinteresse)). See also Oliver, supra
note 2, at 656 (observing that "fi]n this connexion, the Court's statement that loss
of profit may not be 'totally excluded' leaves open the question whether it may be
partially excluded").
245.
See Oliver, supra note 2, at 656 (emphasizing that "[i]t is striking that
the Court regarded compensation for the specific heads of damage referred to in
the second [Factortame] question of the High Court as a matter for the English
courts alone").
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e. Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Fora
The ECJ has consistently held that judicially confirmed
failures of Member States to fulfill their EC Treaty obligations
constitute an important factor for establishing the basis for
2i
potential responsibilities of the defaulting Member State. 6
Brasserie does not appear to include any indication that the ECJ
envisions enabling other Member States or the Commission, in
their own right or on behalf of an individual, to sue a Member
State before its national courts for an alleged breach of
Community law. The Community legal system is designed to
achieve a full spectrum of legal remedies by assigning roles to
different players in the Community and national arenas. Under
the EC Treaty, the Commission and the Member States are
empowered to prosecute Member States before the ECJ for
alleged failures to fulfill EC Treaty obligations. 2 4 7
The
enforcement of ECJ judgments resulting from these actions was
significantly strengthened by the framers of the Maastricht
Treaty, who introduced a scheme of lump sums or penalty
payments for deficient Member State compliance. 2 48 The new
sanctions are designed to establish respect for ECJ judgments,
whereas state liability claims aim at compensation for individual
damages. 2 4 9 The degree to which the individual becomes the
vigilant guardian of Community law25 0 obviates the need for
"adoptive actions" that would unnecessarily separate claimant
and damage as well as blur the lines between the types of actions
provided by the EC Treaty. The individual in turn has no
standing before the ECJ and must sue the Member State in the
national courts. 2 5 ' The ECJ may then become indirectly involved

through a reference proceeding for a preliminary

ruling.

25 2

246.
See, e.g., Case 240/86, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 1988 E.C.R.
1835, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 578; Case 39/72, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1973
E.C.R. 101, [1973] 12 C.M.L.R. 773.
247.
See EC TREATY arts. 226-27.

248.

Id. art. 228(2).

249.

B6hm, supranote 111, at 55 n.23.

250.

See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 82 (1999)

(suggesting that Americans may analogize this role to that of "private attorney
generals," a law technique adopted in a number of U.S. statutes).
25 1.
See Gfi-ter Krohn, Government Liability in Germany for Infringement of
Community Law, in EUROPEAN AMBITIONS OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY 119 (Rosa H.M.

Jansen et al. eds., 1997) (providing an argumentum e contrario based on Articles
235, 288(2) of the EC Treaty).
252.
See EC TREATY art. 234. See also Tana Bums Newell, Book Note, 3
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 523, 525 (1997-98) (reviewing JOSEPHINE STEINER, ENFORCING EC

LAW (1995) (explaining that (1) the ECJ refuses acceptance of certain referrals,
especially when they involve questions that are not sufficiently clear, (2) the Court
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Nevertheless, this conversation between judges, which the
framers of the EC Treaty designed as the "procedural linchpin"
linking the legal orders of the Community and the Member
States, 2 53 has become a powerful tool for the ECJ to shape
Member State liability, including, to a certain extent, 25 4 the non25S
harmonized prongs of the principle.
According to several commentators, the ECJ's Member State
liability jurisprudence may set a significant precedent with
respect to the delicate issue of the liability of private parties for
violations of Community law. 2 56 Those violations may involve the
rules governing antitrust, social policy, public procurement, and
state aid. 25 7 This view has been bolstered by encouraging signals
25 8
from the Commission.

has never rejected a referral for being inappropriate, (3) the appeal of a national
court's decision to refer or not to refer will be governed by domestic remedy rules,
(4) an order of reference cannot be appealed to the ECJ, and (5) therefore, a
uniform standard of review in the Community does not exist and the degree of
protection of individuals' rights may differ by Member State).
253. See FOLSOM, supra note 251, at 90 (explaining that in light of the
functional division of powers between courts, the ECJ, which is not considered a
super-revision instance but a court with delimited jurisdiction, provides the
abstract facades of Community law and the national courts determine and apply
the facts of the case). For critical arguments levied against the design and use of
the reference proceeding, see Waelbroeck, supranote 111, at 323-24 (arguing that
(1) the abstract preliminary ruling leaves the Member State with little room to
argue, and (2) the procedure should be revised to allow for "a better opportunity
for contradictory debate").
254. See Case
C-319/96,
Brinkmann Tabakfabriken
GmbH v.
Skatteministeriet, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5255, 1-5270 [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 673, 690
(explaining that "[w]hile it is, in principle, for the national courts [to adjudicate the
facts of the actual case] . . . in this instance the Court has all the information
necessary in order to [adljudge... the facts.. ."); Case C-261/95, Palmisani v.
Instituto Nazionale della Providenza Sociale (INPS), 1997 E.C.R. 1-4025 (stating,
while "certain aspects of the case provide a basis for the following remarks by the
Court," in one "regard the Court does not have all the information necessary.").
255. For an example of this approach with respect to the third Member
State liability condition of causation between breach and damage, see Brinkmann
Tabakfabriken GmbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5255 (finding no direct causal link in a case
where the Member State authorities, in the absence of a formal implementation
through ministerial decree, had otherwise given immediate effect to the relevant
provisions of the directive at bar). For a case involving a domestic limitation
period, see Palmisani, 1997 E.C.R. 1-4025 (holding that a one-year time limit
cannot be regarded as making it excessively difficult or virtually impossible to
lodge a claim for reparation).
256. See, e.g., Helen Smith, The Francovich Case: State Liability and the
Individual's Right to Damage, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 129 (1992); Julian
Maitiand-Walker, A Step Closer to a Definitive Ruling on a Right in Damages for
Breach of the EC CompetitionRules, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 3 (1992).
257. Waelbroeck, supra note 111, at 318-27 (wondering, however, about the
design of the conditions for liability in damages).
258.
See, e.g., Commission Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts
and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 O.J.
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Another area for discussion involves cross-Member State
jurisdiction when a plaintiff sues an allegedly defaulting Member
State for damages before the courts of another Member State.
General rules of public international law appear to lean towards
jurisdictional immunity in such contexts. 25 9 The special nature
of Community law, however, may override this restrictive
2 60
approach.
f. Codification of State Liability Under Community Law
The Treaty of Amsterdam does not include a provision
governing Member State liability for breach of Community law.
During the preceding Intergovernmental Conference, 26 1 the
United Kingdom had proposed language that would have
circumscribed the exposure of Member States to liability
litigation. 26 2 Nevertheless, the Draft Article on Damages was not
approved. 2 63 Thus, in the absence of an intervention by the

(C 39/05) 6. See also van Gerven, supra note 151, at 530 (discussing Case
128/92, H. J. Banks & Co. Ltd. v. BritishCoal Corporation,1994 E.C.R. 1-1209).
259.
See European Convention on State Immunity art. 15, reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 470, 474 (stating that a 'Contracting State shall be entitled to immunity
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another Contracting State if the proceedings
do not fall within Articles 1 to 14; the Court shall decline to entertain such
proceedings even if the State does not appear").
260.
See Waelbroeck, supra note 111, at 332-33 (explaining that (1)
Francovichmay have dismantled traditional notions of sovereignty, (2) a national
court may not accept the defense of ius irnperiiwhere the other Member State has
violated Community law obligations, and (3) Article 15 of the Basle Convention on
State Immunity constitutes treaty law signed and ratified by some Member States
in violation of their solidarity obligation towards the Community).
261.
For general documentation covering the Maastricht II process, see The
1996 Intergovernmental Conference-Retrospective Database, (visited Feb. 15,
2000) <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/>.
262.
See Refelction Group's Report, Part Two: An Annotated Agenda, at No.
120 (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/
reflect/final.htm> (providing the U.K.'s position that (1) some judgments of the
ECJ are disproportional, and (2) the IGC "should examine possible limits to
[M]ember States economic liability when a [M]ember State has genuinely
attempted to comply with Community law and the application of national time
limits in such cases"). See also A Partnershipof Nations: The British Approach to
the European Union IGC 1996 (12 Mar., 1996) <http://www.fco.uk.europe/
igc/index.html> (suggesting at No. 37 that "that a Member State should only be
liable in damages in cases of serious and manifest breach of its obligations")
(website no longer available, source on file with author).
For modification
proposals predating the IGC, see, for example, Suggestions of the Court of Justice
on European Union, Bulletin of the EC, Supplement 9/75 (containing the ECJ's
thoughts); Sieglerschmidt Report, 10. Jan. 1983 (Doc-1-1052/82) (providing the
European Parliament's ideas).
263.
Craig, supra note 131, at 77 (predicting that "[t]he possibility of a
[t]reaty amendment... to limit the E.C.J.'s powers will be raised once again").

358

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:311

Community legislature, 2 6 4 the further development of the
26 S
principle of state liability remains a matter for the courts.

IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEMBER STATE LIABILITY PRINCIPLE FOR
THE DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS

A. Rendezvous of Supranationaland Municipal Legal Systems in
the Area of State Liability

1. General Observations
According to the ECJ's monist approach, 2 66 the principle of
Member State liability is grounded in the supranational

264.
See Nicholas Green & Ami Barav, Damages in the National Courts for
Breach of Community Law, 6 Y.B. EUR. L. 55, 119 (1986) (stating that "[t]here is
little doubt that some Community legislative work is highly desirable in order to
bring into harmony the normative relationship between the Community and its
Member States, on the one hand, and the internal procedural arrangements
which must accompany them, on the other hand").
265.
See Betlem, supra note 176 (observing that "a step by step
development [of the liability regimes] is the prevalent pattern in the legal systems
of the Member States, as the Court itself noted in... Brasseriel.
266.
Strict monism holds that international law and the national legal
systems constitute one legal order. For the principal theoretical representatives,
see, for example, HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHFE (PURE THEORY OF LAw) (1960);
ALFRED VERDROSS, DIE EINHEIT DES RECHTLICHEN WELTBILDES AUF GRUNDLAGE DER
VOLKERRECHTSVERFASSUNG (1923). See also ALBERT BLECKMANN, EUROPAREcHT 288
(1990) (summarizing that strict monism professes the supremacy of public
international law, which renders conflicting national law void). In contrast, strict
dualism professes that public international law and national law do not exist in a
hierarchical or preferential relation, but coexist in parallel legal spheres. For the
main advocates of classical dualism, see, for example, HEINRICH TRIEPEL,
VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT (1899);
DIONISIO ANZILOTTI,
IL DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE NEI GUIDIZI INTERNI (1905). See also BLECKMANN, supra, at 288-89
(explaining that (1) public international law and municipal law do not overlap but
differ with regard to their sources, governing norms, and addressees; (2)
international treaties, customary international law, and the general rules of
international law constitute the body of public international law that governs the
legal relations between subjects of international law, especially states and
international organizations; (3) national law is basically comprised of the
constitution, laws, regulations, and other rules governing the relations between
state and individual, and individuals inter se; (4) public international law has to
undergo either transformation or execution before being able to penetrate into the
national legal order and bind internal bodies and individuals; and (5)
transformation is the process of receiving international law into a norm of national
law, whereas execution is the result of an order by national act to domestic
authorities stipulating the application of international law).
However, these
"purist" views have been converging over the years. See, e.g., id. at 289 (finding
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Community legal order. 2 6 7 Community law governs the contours
of the liability claim and confers upon individuals a directly
applicable cause of action against the Member States before their
municipal courts. 2 6 8 While an individual who proceeds to enforce
a Community right against a public authority before a national
court must, in the absence of relevant Community rules, use
national remedies and procedures, 2 69 the basic tenets of
Community law270 permeate the institutional and procedural
autonomy of the Member States when it comes to shaping the
restrictions and modalities of the liability claim within the
271
national legal frameworks.
2. Impact on Domestic Liability Infrastructures
The effects from the penetration of Member State liability into
the national legal orders may vary according to the pre-existing
liability infrastructure in the different Member States. 2 72 Certain
domestic orders may be able to absorb the Community law-based

that monist scholars continue to derive the sovereign powers of the states from
public international law but concede the delegation of territorial and personal
powers to the state through public international law, thus enabling national law to
determine the position of public international law within the internal legal order of
the state); id. at 289-90 (noting that the moderated version of dualism recognizes
the operation of public international law vis-&-vis individuals, however, only after
the national "sovereignty shell" (Souverdnitdtspanze} has been opened or lifted).
267.
See B6hm, supra note 111, at 59.
268.
See Kopp, supranote 131, at 646.
269.
See, e.g., Joined Cases C-430/93 & C-431/93, van Schijndel & van
Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4705, 14737-38 [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 801, 826-28 (referring to the possibility or obligation
for the national jurisdictions to automatically raise any arguments based on
infringements of Community law); Joined Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v.
Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5416 [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 115 (holding
that "it is a matter for the internal legal order of the Member States to determine
the competent courts and lay down the procedural rules for legal proceedings");
Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfmanz & Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer
fir das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1997 (emphasizing that "it is the national
courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal protections which citizens
derive from... Community law").
270.
See EDWARD & LANE, supranote 3, at 57-58 (explaining that these basic
Community law principles include "full effectiveness" and "equivalence").
271.
See Oliver, supra note 2, at 638. But see Emiliou, supra note 139, at
406 (stating that this may be hard to reconcile with the principle of procedural
autonomy of the Member States).
272.
In general, certain civil law systems have tended to provide easy access
to damages against public authorities, whereas thresholds seem higher in
common law jurisdictions. In support of the proposition, see EDWARD & LANE,
supra note 3, at 59 (providing examples of litigation in Belgium, France, and the
United Kingdom).
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claim into the state liability systems that are already in place.
In that sense, national norms operate as a vehicle for Member
State liability subject, however, to Community law prerequisites
affecting the
installation
of liability
restrictions, 2 7 4
the
275
subsidiarity of the action for damages,
the concept of fault in
the context of the liability trigger, 27 6 and the extent of the damage
award. 27 7 In other legal orders, Member State liability cases may
proceed through autonomous sui generis causes of action. 27 8 In
this sense, a new tort avenue arises. Finally, in the longer term,
Member State liability jurisprudence may create a spillover
impact and affect scenarios that do not directly involve a
Community law component, 2 79 ultimately giving rise to a greater
level of convergence among the Member States. 2 80 The BGH's
Brasserie judgment offers an illustrative case study for Germany.

273. See Betlem, supra note 176 (summarizing for the Netherlands that "[ilf
the Dutch State breaches EC law, it will be liable under less strict conditions
than the ones of Brasserie"); Craig, supra note 131, at 88-89 (explaining that
under U.K. domestic law the action for breach of statutory duty may accommodate
Member State liability). But see EDWARD & LANE, supra note 3, at 59 (observing in
the case of the United Kingdom that (1) liability claims, absent full-fledged
statutory remedies, proceed under the umbrella of the British transformation law,
and (2) the courts have started to bypass the doctrine of legislative sovereignty of
Parliament by granting a liability claim for violations of the general principle that
"everybody has to act in good faith and do their best"); Kopp, supra note 131, at
646 (explaining that full-fledged legal protection requires the enactment of a
statutory liability basis).
274. See Oliver, supranote 2, at 646.
275. See B6hm, supra note 111, at 59-60.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See Craig, supra note 131, at 87-88 (explaining that, in the United
Kingdom, the new tort would embrace the ECJ's three elements); Kopp, supra
note 131, at 646 (observing for France that, because French judges do not
consider themselves tightly bound by the ECJ's Member State liability
jurisprudence, a novel legal remedy of fault liability is necessary to regulate
liability resulting from legislative injustice). But see Dutheil de la Roch~re, supra
note 111, at 17-18 (explaining that (1) the French public liability system does not
rank among the most restrictive ones, (2) "the principle of objective liability due to
acts of Parliament or due to delegated legislation based on the breach of the
principle of equality" has been acknowledged for a long time, and (3) since
Francovich, "French jurisdictions [have shown] a remarkable tendency to leave
room for the infringement of [Community] law... as a ground for the liability of
the [s]tate authorities").
279.
See Craig, supra note 131, at 89-94 (discussing, inter alia, reform
plans in the United Kingdom that involve (1) the creation of a new liability head
based on ultra vires, (2) the adoption of a risk theory, and (3) greater usage of ex
gratia payments of compensation).
But see Kopp, supra note 131, at 646
(observing that prevailing Euro-scepticism has thus far prevented legislative
action).
280. See generally van Gerven, supra note 151, at 507-08 (using "cable
cases," which involve loss not directly consequential upon injury to property, to
explain that (1) at first sight, English, French, German, and Dutch law seem
...
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B. Reflections upon the BGH's Dismissalof
Brasserie-A Case Study
Harmonizing the basic concepts of existing domestic
government liability remedies with the system and modalities of
Member State liability under Community law remains a daunting
task in Germany. 2 8 ' From a German perspective, Member State
liability does at present constitute a distinct sui generis
remedy. 28 2 In consequence, absent a major national reform of
public tort liability,28 3 the German legal order provides two
distinct liability avenues for legislative injustice. 28 4 One track is
offered for infringements of domestic law under pre-existing
liability vehicles 28 5 and the other for breaches of Community law
28 6
under Brasserieprinciples.
The BGH proceeded under the two-track model. The BGH
first adjudicated the domestic causes of action under domestic
legal
rules
without
superimposing
Community
law
287
requirements.
Then, on a separate basis, the BGH tested a

widely divergent and unbridgeable, however less so at second glance, and (2) the
basic bridges of Community law drive towards remedy harmonization).
281.
See generally Kopp, supranote 131.
282.
See id.
283.
See Krohn, supranote 252, at 123 n.15 (explaining that Brasseriemay
represent a new incentive for the German legislature to reinvigorate its efforts of
replacing the old liability model of 'sliding public liability" with a modem law of
direct state liability).
284.
See id.
285.
See Craig, supra note 131, at 87.
286.
See Kopp, supranote 131, at 646.
287.
See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 2, at 646 (explaining that the narrow
restriction under German law baring liability claims that result from a Federal
statute contrary to the Basic Law, unless the act or omission of the legislature is
referable to an individual situation, cannot be applied by analogy to breaches of
Community law and must be set aside, because such a rule makes the recovery of
damages impossible or excessively difficult); van Gerven, supra note 151, at 536
(stating that the remedy under § 839 BGB has to be "enlarged by way of
interpretation or disapplication); B6hm, supra note 111, at 60 (reconfirming that
the German liability restriction is no longer viable when applied to legislative and
normative breaches of Community law). See also Gerrit Betlem & Birgit
Schoitwohl, FrancovichFollow-Up A Survey of Cases on State Liabilityfor Breach of
European Community Law, <http:/www.asser.nl/er/fran/francovi.htm> (noting
that (1) human rights law may affect access limitations to the right of
compensation because such restrictions may amount to a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and (2) the Treaty of Amsterdam
explicitly codified the ECJ's jurisdiction to review the compatibility of Community
acts with the ECHR, at Articles 46(d) and 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, as
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam). For an illustration of the potential reach
of human rights law, see Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, 332 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1996) (holding that a tort claim for compensation is an "asset" and
constitutes a 'possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the
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Community law-based claim without transferring the access
restrictions of the national law track.28 8 While the application of
the new sui generis liability regime fell to the national courts in
absence of a formal domestic basis, 28 9 the BGH was not in a
position to hold off until the German legislature regulated
legislative injustice in violation of Community law through
statutory law. 2 90 Awaiting a statutory codification would have
involved unacceptable delays in pending judicial proceedings and
created a significant formal legal vacuum. 2 9 1 Moreover, the size
of the claim did not threaten to drain public funds to an extent
2 92
necessitating legislative action.
The ECJ's Brasseriepreliminary ruling had basically directed
the BGH to determine the full predictability of the ECJ's case law
predating the first beer ruling of March 12, 1987.293
As
previously discussed, the ECJ held that the designation
prohibition constituted a serious breach of Community law,
whereas the ban on additives was not inexcusable. 2 94 The BGH
embraced these determinations but, using its margin of
maneuver within the assessment of the causation requirement for

European Convention of Human Rights); Betlem & SchoiSwohl, supra (explaining
that Article 6(1) ECHR was not examined by the Human Rights Court because of
an overlap with the complaint pertaining to Protocol No. 1).
288.
See Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971, 97780.
289. See Krohn, supra note 252, at 122 (generally criticizing that 'the
German court, whose fundamental commitment to formal law is a key element in
the system of separation of powers, is essentially overtaxed despite its related
power to supplement and continue written law").
290. See id. at 121 (referring to the German State Liability Act
(Staatshaftungsgesetz)of 1981). Section 5(2)[1] of the State Liability Act stipulated
that the rise and extent of liability for unlawful acts by the legislature should be
subject to a specific legal provision. See id. at 121 n.7. But see BVerfGE 61, 149
(preempting the entry into force of this law).
291. See Krohn, supra note 252, at 122 (caveating that "an increase in
consistency of the law cannot be expected with the passing of the new liability
institute to the national courts") (emphasis omitted).
292. Id. at 123.
293. See Oliver, supranote 2, at 645. One commentator observed that
[w]hile expressing its wish to avoid encroaching on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the national courts to Trod the facts and decide how to
characterize the breaches of Community law at issue,' the Court
nevertheless deemed it helpful to indicate a number of circumstances
which the national courts might take into account ...
[and embarked]
upon the faintly curious exercise of determining which of its own earlier
rulings had been fully predictable.
Id.
294. See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du P~cheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029; [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889.
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state liability, connected the damage alleged by the plaintiff with
the ban on additives. 2 95 This approach became the cornerstone
for the ful dismissal of the plaintifffs claim pertaining to the
period between 1981 and 1987.296 The designation prohibition,
while determined sufficiently serious, was not found causal for
damages incurred by the plaintiff.29 7 The ban on additives,
which was deemed the predominant or sole cause of the
damages, was not considered a grave and manifest breach of
Community law.2 98 These findings, however, have not been
immune from criticism in both directions in the legal literature.
Some suggest that the BGH could have declined to categorize
Germany's designation prohibition as a sufficiently serious
breach of Community law, because the ECJ's first beer judgment
did not flatly outlaw the pertinent statutory provision but only
arrived at a violation of Community law after an extensive
consideration of the proportionality principle, which would have
2 99
suggested a labeling regime in lieu of a marketing prohibition.
This approach seems to resurrect the elaborate considerations
advanced by the German Federal Government at the time to save
its designation prohibition. 30 0 In contrast, those viewing the
designation prohibition as an open and grave violation of
Community law emphasize
that Germany's
designation
prohibition did not pose a novel type of infringement, as the
ECJ's case law predating the first beer judgment was clear and
30
evident for similar scenarios. '
Several commentators concede that the BGH enjoyed a wider
30 2
latitude of evaluation when assessing the ban on additives.
Others doubt that Germany's ban on additives constituted a
significantly less obvious breach of Community law, because the

295.

See Brasserie du Pdcheur SA v. Germany, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 971, 980-

82.
296.
See Oliver, supra note 2, at 657 (explaining that, as a result of this
construction, "no liability might arise-a question on which the Court of Justice
expressed no view").
297.
See Brasserie du PecheurSA, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 980.
298.
Seeid.at 981.
299.
See Krohn, supra note 252, at 125 (concluding that these
considerations are 'sure to have consequences for the basis and size of the
liability").
300.
Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, [1988] 1
C.M.L.R. 780 (presenting Germany's submissions).
301.
Ehlers, supranote 9, at 780.
302.
See Krohn, supranote 252, at 125 (stating that (1) the "antimony" with
Article 30 of the EC Treaty is 'significantly less imperative," and (2) "[i]n the case
of an affirmed liability it may also become significant... that the ECJ derived the
unlawfulness from an infringement of the principle of reasonableness," since
Germany banned all additives, as opposed to individual substances that were
posing appreciable health concerns).
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very health considerations that were invoked as a justification for
the preclusion of all beers containing any type of additive were
reduced in weight when it became clear that they were applied to
other beverages. 30 3 Moreover, some argue that in light of the
ECJ's logic of finding a sufficiently serious breach, especially in
the wake of continuous defiance of a previous judgment,3 0 4 the
continued ban on additives had to be deemed a persistent and
sufficiently serious breach of Community law after March 12,
1987.305
On December 31, 1989, the Commission officially
reported that Germany had not yet fully complied with the ECJ's
beer ruling.3 0 6 Germany did not formally amend the wording of
its deficient legislation until several years later. Nevertheless, the
BGH found that German authorities had implemented the ECJ
ruling with all due haste through circulars requesting the
immediate application of the judgment-decisive facts, which,
30 7
according to the BGH, the plaintiffs failed to dispute.
The ECJ has left the assessment of the causation element to
the national courts, albeit limited by the Community principles of
effectiveness and equivalence.
The BGH's move of causally
connecting the damage with the ban on additives, which was not
considered sufficiently serious, while denying causation between
the sufficiently serious infringement posed by the designation
prohibition, has been criticized for several reasons.
Some
commentators hold that the designation prohibition did provide a
direct cause for the rise of the damage, because the ban on
additives affected only beverages already denominated as beer
and the distribution under a different designation would have
equally or similarly affected sales.3 0 8 Accordingly, one causal
event unleashed by a seriously sufficient breach of Community
law triggering liability consequences could not be undone by
creating a second insufficiently serious causal contribution.3 0 9
Other commentators in the legal literature delve deeper into the
theoretical underpinnings of causation and extract approaches

303. See Ehlers, supranote 9, at 780 (not further exploring this question).
304. See Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v.
Germany & The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport exparte Factortame Ltd,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1-1150, [19961 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 990 (stating that '[o]n any
view, a breach of Community law will clearly be sufficiently serious if it has
persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement in question to be
established").
305.
See Oliver, supranote 2, at 657.
306.
See 1990 O.J. (C 232) 43 (providing the seventh annual report on the
application of Community law during 1989). See also 1989 O.J. (C 330) 43
(relating to 1988); 1991 O.J. (C 338) 62 (pertaining to 1990).
307. See Oliver, supra note 2, at 657.
308. Ehlers, supra note 9, at 780.
309. Id.
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for limiting state liability.3 1 0 In the context of German tort law,
supplementing the prevailing theory of adequate causation3 1 1
with the doctrine of the protective purpose of the norm would
generally limit compensation to losses that are within the
protective ambit of the liability principle.3 1 2 In cases involving
transgressions of the proportionality principle, one commentator
has proposed barring a plaintiff from claiming compensation for
financial losses that would have occurred in the event of a
reasonable, and therefore lawful, act or omission. 3 13 Moreover,
plaintiffs alleging the improper exercise of discretion would be
required to prove that appropriate use would have avoided their
loss. 3 14 Another suggestion restricting liability would require a
direct link between the allegations of legislative injustice and
financial
loss. 3 1 5
Under
this
approach,
intervening
administrative action could interrupt the chain of causation. A
final, more esoteric observation relates to the degree that losses
3 16
are attributable to prevailing customer habits.
The BGH did not have to address the potential subsidiarity of
the Member State liability action or the quantum of the damages.
Several commentators contend that, even assuming all other
Member State liability conditions were met, Brasserie's action
would have ultimately failed for not seeking judicial redress in

310.
See Krohn, supra note 252, at 125-26 (providing insights into German
causation teachings).
311.
See id. at 125 (explaining that adequate causation focuses on the
course of events following dutiful actions and the corresponding hypothetical
situation of the injured party).
312.
See id. at 125-26 (emphasizing that (1) the German BGH has
repeatedly qualified the reach of the protective purpose as the authoritative
criterion for the outcome of liability cases, and (2) Community law will not be
unduly impaired by the application of the "protective principle," especially in light
of the ECJ's case law pertaining to Article 288(2) of the EC Treaty).
313.
See id. at 126 (using the terms proportional and reasonable
interchangeably).
314.
See id. (assigning the onus of proof to the plaintiffs).
315.
See id. at 132 (noting that the ECJ did not address this issue in its
preliminary opinion).
316.
See id. (suggesting that (1) German consumers may have been
committed to beers brewed according to the Purity Requirement for Beer
independent of existing legislation, (2) "[u]nder certain circumstances a
comparison of sales volumes before and after the phase of forced limitation of
sales can be revealing,* (3) "[a]n alleviation of the burden of evidence may be
applied for a transitional period after termination of the trade impediment," and
(4) this type of limitation may not violate essentials of Community law, which
recognizes the consideration of "politico-economic" factors in non-contractual
liability cases); Streinz, supra note 119, at 204 (adding that (1) one could doubt
the existence of a damage, and (2) German law does not provide for exemplary
damages).
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German courts before the alleged damage arose.3 17
These
primary legal remedies, which reflect the plaintiffs duty of
mitigation, would have included the action for annulment3 1 8 or
the action for a declaration 3 19 before the appropriate
administrative courts as well as the individual constitutional
complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court.3 20 Under the

317.
See, e.g., Ehlers, supra note 9, at 780-83 (providing an extensive
analysis of the primacy of primary judicial redress, while open whether the
statutes of limitations pursuant to § 852 BGB and Article 43 of the Statute of the
ECJ would have barred the action); Krohn, supra note 252, at 127-29
(emphasizing that the duty of mitigation corresponds to the injured party's
obligation of exhausting the "right of appeal" under German public liability law
pursuant to § 839(3) BGB).
318.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 780 (explaining that (1) the facts of the
case do not quite reveal how the German authorities interceded against the
products of Brasserie, (2) since the authorities apparently ordered fines against at
least one employee of Brasserie's German distribution firm and several different
buyers acting for food market chains, one would have had to attribute the inaction
of the concerned parties to Brasserie for construing the admissibility of the
annulment action, and (3) if the German authorities, in addition, declined to
process Brasserie's products imported by the distributor at the German border or
barred German firms from continuing to market Brasserie's products in Germany,
Brasserie could have brought an admissible annulment action as a directly and
individually concerned third party); Krohn, supra note 252, at 128 (commenting
that Brasserie was affected by (1) the sales prohibition under § 10 of the BStG and
(2) by virtue of trade limitations illegally impeding its commercial activities).
319.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 780-81 (reasoning that, in any case, an
action directed at a declaration that the provisions of the purity law for beer did
not apply to products of Brasserie would have been successful because the action
would have (1) involved a real interpartescontroversy regarding the application of
a norm, as opposed to an abstract, erga omnes control of a an existing or future
parliamentary statute, (2) clarified the applicability of the provisions of the purity
law for beer to Brasserie's products, thus pertaining to the existence or nonexistence of a legal relationship sufficiently concretized by particular
circumstances, albeit hinging on the validity of a legal norm adjudged divergently
by the parties to the proceeding, (3) reflected a legitimate interest of Brasserie,
and (4) met the subsidiarity hurdle through resolving the legal situation for
Brasserie); Krohn, supranote 252, at 129 (providing similar rationales).
320.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 781-83 (concluding that a constitutional
complaint would have been admissible and successful on the merits).
The
admissibility of an individual constitutional complaint against statutory law
pursuant to GG art. 93 Nr. 4a in conjunction with BVerfGG 13 Nr. 8a, 90-93
requires (1) standing, (2) compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, and (3)
observance of the statute of limitations. Id. (explaining that (1) the complainant,
despite being a foreign legal person, was a proper applicant with the requisite
interest due to being individually, presently, and directly concerned by the
violation of its freedom to exercise its profession; (2) the heightened general
significance of the judgment for a multitude of cases involving the adjustment of
national law to Community law requirements trumped subsidiarity; and (3) the
designation prohibition did not trigger the one-year time bar because it involved
legislative omission, while the clock for the additives ban did not start running
until January 1, 1978 when the pertinent provision of the foodstuffs and
feedingstuffs law entered into force). An individual constitutional complaint is
successful on the merits if the Constitutional Court concludes that the legislative
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circumstances of the case, that line of reasoning continues, the
plaintiff company could have been reasonably expected to prevent
321
or limit its loss appropriately by seeking primary legal relief.
Commentators addressing the size of the compensation note that
the domestic legal systems may have some margin of maneuver
as long as they do not frustrate the Community law parameters of
effectiveness and equivalence.3 22 A complete exclusion of certain
heads of damages, including lost profit, from qualifying as
32 3
restitutable losses is therefore disallowed by Community law.
Several potential limitations have been advanced in the literature.
National law could require that the lost profit fall within the
protective area of the infringed principle.3 24 Moreover, subjective
3 25
standards governing the unlawfulness could be raised.
Finally, the compensation could be restricted to lost profits in
3 26
excess of normal earnings.
In sum, a majority opinion in the legal literature appears to
conclude that the dismissal of Brasserie's action was justified,
albeit for different reasons. This may explain why Brasserie did
not pursue an individual constitutional complaint before the
Federal Constitutional Court alleging that the BGH judgment

action or omission posed a violation of basic rights under the German
constitution. Id. (observing that (1) the designation regulation for beer and the
import restriction imposed on impure beers impinged upon the Brasserie's
freedom to exercise its profession, and (2) in light of Article 30 of the EC Treaty
and its associated system of immanent limitations and justifications, the
infringement was not justifiable pursuant to domestic constitutional aspects, and
(3) the scope of the individual constitutional complaint against laws had to be
expanded and encompass Community law adverse statutes).
321.
See, e.g., Ehlers, supra note 9, at 783 (rejecting even a "dilatory
damage' since Brasserie did not act at all); Krohn, supra note 252, at 128
(explaining that (1) the plaintiff could have provided financial assistance enabling
employees of its distributors to challenge the fires, and (2) the plaintiff was
particularly challenged by the trade impediments erected against the distributors).
But see Streinz, supra note 119, at 204 (doubting that Brasserie's failure to
encourage legal action is imputable to the plaintiff).
322.
See Krohn, supra note 252, at 131 (explaining that "[tlhis gives the
national court a certain latitude, the extent of which it cannot however be sure of,
due to the lack of pertinent national standardization").
323.
See id. See also A.G. Toth, The Concepts of Damage and Causality as
Elements of Non-Contractual Liability, in THE AcTION FOR DAMAGES IN COMMUNITY
LAW, supra note 111, at 179, 187 (using the term lucrum cessans for the
compensation of lost profits and damnum emergens for the compensation of loss
actually sustained).
324.
See Krohn, supra note 252, at 131 (describing that (1) German public
liability law, according to § 839 BGB in conjunction with GG art. 34, provides
such "far-reaching compensation," and (2) in addition, the plaintiff may also
benefit from the alleviated burden of proof pursuant to § 252 Nr. 2 BGB).
325.
See id. (querying whether the liability formula of a sufficiently serious
breach meets a potential threshold of fault).
326.
See id. (offering the rationale to avoid inequitable hardship).
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violated its basic rights. The BGH's decision seems to suggest the
proposition that national courts, which continue to serve as the
principal fora for the enforcement of Community rights,3 27 have
used their latitude, within Community law parameters, to act as
gatekeepers. Legal commentators have in this context noted the
BGH's general historic posture of preserving the political
prerogatives of the legislature and protecting the state from
inundation with liability claims.3 28 Finally, despite the increasing
role of Community law,3 29 overall domestic adjudication trends

indicate that the specter of open floodgates in the area of Member
State liability has not materialized.

V.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ECJ has played an instrumental role in propelling
Community law into new dimensions of international law.33 0

A

high degree of juridification characterizes the relationship
between Community law and national law. As a result of the
primacy of Community law, the domestic legal orders may be
deeply permeated by supranational judge-made law. From the
ECJ's perspective, the rise of Member State liability continues to
increase the completeness of the judicial review system that
binds together the Community and the Member States by
increasing the powers and vigilance of individuals in the process
of controlling the enforcement of Community law. The new
feature complements the broad spectrum of Community lawinspired

remedies,

including restitution,3 3 1

interim

relief,3 3 2

damages based on direct effect and indirect effect as well as
Francovichprinciples,3 3 3 and informal complaint avenues.3 3 4 The

327.
See STEINER, supra note 138, at 30.
328.
See Ehlers, supranote 9, at 783.
329.
See Waelbroeck, supra note 111, at 315 (emphasizing (1) the
heightened degree to which Community law and national law are interwoven in
light of the integration progress and (2) the increased legislative activity of
Community institutions in the course of the single market program).
330.
See Pierce Pescatore, Droit Communitaire et Droit International Public,
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPPEN (CDE) 501, 503 (1970) (exclaiming "du moment que

l'on abandonne l'idde d'une souverainetd internationaleabsolue et intangible... [on
introduit] des mthodes d'action qui seraient inconcevables dans le droit
internationale classique); see also Lord Denning MR in the English Court of
Appeal's judgment of May 22, 1974 in H. P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger SA. [1974]
3 W.L.R. 202, 209 (C.A.), [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1231 (observing that Community
law is "like an incoming tide [flowing] into the estuaries and up the rivers").
331.
See STEINER, supranote 138, at 46-47.
332.
See id. at 47-50.
333.
See id. at 14-22, 50-53, 172 (opining that claims under Francovichmay
ultimately "replace actions based on the principle of indirect effect and even those
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ECJ's Brasserie judgment further develops the Member State
liability principle in the post-Francovich era by expanding its
scope to cases involving legislative injustice.3 3 5
The seminal
decision, which illustrates that "the king can do wrong, "3 3 6 uses
general criteria for shaping effective remedies, while allowing the
necessary differentiations to follow from the nature of the breach
337
at hand.
Brasserie, which avoids automatic liability for bona fide acts
or omissions of public authorities, has established the threeprong blueprint for the rise of Member State liability: (1) the rule
of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on the
individual, (2) the breach must be sufficiently serious, and (3) the
breach of the obligation incumbent upon the state and the
damage incurred by the injured parties must have a direct casual
link. 3 a3 This set of conditions has become the mantra for the
33 9
ECJ's Member State liability jurisprudence of the late 1990s.
The hybrid standard, which is constituted and based in
Community law but effectuated in the domestic legal orders,
belongs to the acquis communautaire.34 In theory, the scope of
the ensuing imposition of liability may be considered
revolutionary, especially in those Member States that do not even
recognize strict legislative liability. Nevertheless, Member State
actions originate within the procedural and institutional

based on direct effects where the opponent's 'public' status is doubtful"); see also
van Gerven, supra note 151, at 516 n.39 (explaining that the principle of Member
State liability and the requirement of interpretation of national law in conformity
with directives 'render the refusal to acknowledge the horizontal direct effect of
directives.., of little interest").
334.
See STEINER, supra note 332, at 161-69 (listing complaints to the
Commission, European Parliament, and Member States, however, under the
caveat that very few individuals pursue these avenues, and noting that complaints
tend to be more effective if they issue from organizations operating in Brussels or
Strasbourg).
335.
See Ehlers, supra note 9, at 776 (emphasizing that government
liability, prior to Brasserie, was not recognized for breaches of Community law by
national legislatures); see also Streinz, supra note 119, at 202 (emphasizing that,
in addition to the United Kingdom and Germany as the immediately involved
Member States, Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland, and the Netherlands
participated in the proceedings, thereby evidencing the significance that was
attributed to the case).
336.
Betlem, supra note 176.
337.
See Streinz, supra note 119, at 202.
338.
See Heukels & McDonnell, supra note 145, at 8 (observing that the
legitimacy of Community law is strengthened as a result of the Member States'
acceptance of the duty to compensate for their breaches of Community law).
339.
See Oliver, supra note 2, at 658 (predicting "confidently .. . that the
Court wili draw on [the Brasserieprinciples] ... for many years to come").
340.
See Reich, supra note 140, at 716 (speaking of a third pillar in state
liability law).
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frameworks of the domestic legal systems. Since only questions
pertaining to the legal interpretation of Community law may
reach the ECJ through reference proceedings, the national courts
adjudicating the facts of each case hold important prerogatives,
even when considered in light of the ECJ's guidance and the
Community principles of effectiveness and equivalence.3 4 1
The BGH's dismissal of the claim for damages and the overall
Member State liability trends in Germany and other Member
States illustrate that the doctrine of state liability is not openended. National judges, who ultimately apply the facts of each
liability case, may act as gatekeepers. While the BGH's approach
of solving the case through causation acrobatics may be subject
to criticism, the overall result appears defensible. Requiring a
heightened threshold of qualified breaches of law and a prior
exhaustion of primary legal remedies balances the Community's
compliance and deterrence interests with the Member States'
concern to protect the political prerogatives of their domestic
legislatures. As the Community continues to propel toward a
larger polity of citizens, Member States will continue to assert
their space within the evolutionary energy field that envelops the
Community and the Member States. 3

42

Meanwhile, beer drinkers

from all over the world may continue to enjoy beers brewed
43
according to the Reinheitsgebot.1

341. See Emiliou, supranote 139, at 409, 411 (explaining that (1) the ECJ's
approach leaves the national courts with some difficult questions, and (2) the
national judges seem anxious to receive more elaborate directions from the ECJ
within the role given by the EC Treaty); see also Green & Barav, supra note 265,
at 119 (emphasizing that "[t]he proliferation of Community law makes it particular
important that, in the area of judicial protection of individuals vested with
Community rights, there should be clear guidelines as to the extent and scope of
the remedies to which individuals may be entitled and which the national courts
are required to afford").
342.
See B6hm, supra note 111, at 60 (explaining that the challenge
constitutes an indispensable condition for the legitimation and acceptance of the
relationship between the Community and the Member States).
343. For an overview of German beers, see for example, DeVito, supra note
4, at 15-26. Alt or Altbier (Dfisseldorf, M-anster, Dortmund) is well-hopped and
brewed warm with top-fermenting yeasts but stored cold, Bock or Doppelbock
(Mfinchen) are strong lagers for consumption in winter and spring that are
characterized by a high-malt content and a lengthy, cold maturation), Dortmunder
Export or Helles (Nordrhein-Westfalen) is a less hoppy but more malty beer,
K61schbier (K6ln) is a golden summer beer with an unfiltered and cloudy finish,
Mdrzen (Mfinchen), which is traditionally brewed in March, has a sweet and malty
taste, and Weissbier or Weizenbier (Bayem) exhibit a huge wheat content.

